Results 41 to 50 of about 191 (152)
A Scale for Mixed Reasons for Belief
Noûs, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Epistemic reasons matter for what you should believe. But then, some think there are practical reasons that matter, too. How could both sorts of reasons be weighed together to determine the doxastic states you ought to hold, all things considered?
Matthew Vermaire
wiley +1 more source
Forgive, Because You Were Forgiven
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Philosophical orthodoxy has it that forgiveness is always discretionary—a gift we are free to extend to those who wrong us, but one that we are never morally required to offer. I dispute this orthodoxy, arguing that forgiveness is sometimes obligatory, even though wrongdoers can never demand or otherwise extract it from us.
Abraham Mathew
wiley +1 more source
Metaethics and the Functions of Moral Language
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Metaethics has long included debates about the function of moral discourse. Some have argued that moral statements express our attitudes, others that they serve as prescriptions for how to act, still others that they describe moral facts or properties.
Amie L. Thomasson
wiley +1 more source
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Evaluative adjectives are gradable. The standard for falling under a gradable adjective “F” is either context‐relative or absolute. Some philosophers have recently used general linguistic tests to argue that “rational” and (moral) “good” are maximum‐degree absolute gradable adjectives: Only what's perfectly morally good strictly counts as ...
Pekka Väyrynen
wiley +1 more source
Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle: A Defense of Epistemic Options
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Moral philosophers generally affirm that there are moral options: a single person sometimes has multiple morally permissible actions at a time. But epistemologists generally deny that there are epistemic options: a single person never has multiple epistemically permissible doxastic attitudes at a time. This asymmetry is striking.
Chris Tucker, Elizabeth Jackson
wiley +1 more source
External‐World Skepticism and the New Ethics of Belief
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT External‐world skepticism challenges, among other things, the epistemic credentials of beliefs about other people. Some external‐world skeptics deny that I know my loved ones exist; some claim that my belief that my loved ones exist is epistemically impermissible. However, abandoning this belief would be highly unattractive.
James Fritz
wiley +1 more source
Social ontology and the virtuous circle in public education [PDF]
, 2018 En este artículo argumentamos que la naturaleza pública o privada de la educación tiene una incidencia directa en las instituciones que conforman la realidad social.
González Fernández, Rodrigo +3 more
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Ratio, EarlyView.ABSTRACT In bioethics, two sorts of normative categories are commonly used. These can be split into two families: the deontic categories, such as ‘right’, ‘ought to’ and ‘requirement’, and the evaluative categories, including ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘better than’ and ‘the best’. While other normative concepts such as ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ have also been discussed,
Ronan Ó Maonaile, James Hart
wiley +1 more source
Risk, Recklessness, and Objectivism
Ratio, EarlyView.ABSTRACT One classic objection to Objectivism about ought is that it recommends unconscionably risky actions in so‐called Three‐Option‐Cases, the most famous of which is Jackson's case featuring a doctor called Jill. Some philosophers deny this orthodoxy and claim that Objectivism can yet account for our intuitions in such cases.
Daniele Bruno
wiley +1 more source
Justice of punishment: Theoretical format and law enforcement practice
, 2021 The article analyzes the theoretical and law enforcement aspects of justice as a principle of punishability, the purpose of criminal punishment and the general commencement of sentencing.
Egorova, Tatyana I.
core +1 more source