Results 221 to 230 of about 818,934 (319)

Playing the System: Electoral Bias in the 2024 UK General Election

open access: yesThe Political Quarterly, Volume 96, Issue 1, Page 65-73, January/March 2025.
Abstract The UK's 2024 general election was the least proportional of modern times. Labour's substantial parliamentary majority rested on the smallest ever winning party vote share. The Conservatives, meanwhile, suffered one of their worst ever results.
Charles Pattie, David Cutts
wiley   +1 more source

One‐Sidedness and the Inferior Function in Coriolanus and Timon of Athens

open access: yesJournal of Analytical Psychology, EarlyView.
Abstract For both Jung and Shakespeare, one‐sidedness is the fundamental tragic trait. Jung proposed that as an individual develops, they inevitably associate their identity with certain modes of perception and interaction, and that this leads to psychological polarization.
Sofie Qwarnström
wiley   +1 more source

Strategic Influencers and the Shaping of Beliefs

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Influencers, from propagandists to sellers, expend vast resources targeting agents who amplify their message through word‐of‐mouth communication. While agents differ in network position, they also differ in their bias: Agents may naturally read articles with a particular slant or buy products from a certain seller.
Akhil Vohra
wiley   +1 more source

Stable Price Dispersion under Heterogeneous Buyer Consideration

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study the pricing of homogeneous products sold to customers who consider different sets of suppliers. We identify prices that are stable in the sense that no firm wishes to undercut a rival or to raise its price when rivals are able to respond by offering special deals.
David P. Myatt, David Ronayne
wiley   +1 more source

Reduced-order linearized dynamic model for induction motor-driven centrifugal fan-pump system. [PDF]

open access: yesSci Rep
Turkeri C   +5 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Optimal Job Design and Information Elicitation

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT When managers rely on their subordinates for local information but cannot commit to how such information is used, the incentives for effort and information elicitation become intertwined. This incentive problem influences the firm's job design decision, that is, whether to assign all tasks in a job to one worker (“individual assignment”) or ...
Arijit Mukherjee   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

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