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Erkenntnis, 2013
This special issue of Erkenntnis is devoted to the varieties of disagreement that arise in different areas of discourse, and the consequences we should draw from these disagreements, either concerning the subject matter and its objectivity, or concerning our own views about this subject matter if we learn, for example, that an epistemic peer disagrees ...
Cohnitz, Daniel, Marques, Teresa
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This special issue of Erkenntnis is devoted to the varieties of disagreement that arise in different areas of discourse, and the consequences we should draw from these disagreements, either concerning the subject matter and its objectivity, or concerning our own views about this subject matter if we learn, for example, that an epistemic peer disagrees ...
Cohnitz, Daniel, Marques, Teresa
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Metaphilosophy, 2017
AbstractA commonly neglected feature of the so‐calledEqual Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge.
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AbstractA commonly neglected feature of the so‐calledEqual Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge.
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2023
Abstract One common argument for moral skepticism appeals to the prevalence of moral disagreement. It holds that the best explanation for the widespread disagreement about moral facts is that there simply are no such facts, so there is nothing to constrain our beliefs.
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Abstract One common argument for moral skepticism appeals to the prevalence of moral disagreement. It holds that the best explanation for the widespread disagreement about moral facts is that there simply are no such facts, so there is nothing to constrain our beliefs.
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Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement
Erkenntnis, 2013It is often thought that the correct metaphysics and epistemology of reasons will be broadly unified across different kinds of reason: reasons for belief, and reasons for action. This approach is sometimes thought to be undermined by the contrasting natures of belief and of action: whereas belief appears to have the ‘constitutive aim’ of truth (or ...
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Predicting Philosophical Disagreement
Philosophy Compass, 2013Abstract We review evidence showing that disagreement in folk and expert philosophical intuitions can be predicted by global, heritable personality traits. The review focuses on recent studies of intuitions about free will, ethics, and intentional action.
Feltz, A., Cokely, E.
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Epistemology of Disagreement: Which Disagreement?
Grazer Philosophische StudienAbstract Far from considering the phenomenon of disagreement across the board, the peer debate in epistemology solely focuses on cases of disagreements that are at least assumed to be genuine. What counts as a genuine disagreement is most of the times kept on the level of a pre-theoretical intuition according to which the peers disagree insofar as they
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Discounting under disagreement [PDF]
, 2013 A group of time consistent agents has access to a common productive resource stock whose output provides their consumption needs. The agents disagree about the appropriate pure rate of time preference to use when choosing a consumption policy, and thus delegate the management of the resource to a social planner who allocates consumption efficiently ...
Geoffrey Heal, Antony Millner
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2019
Abstract The following, broadly conciliatory, line on peer disagreement is very popular in current philosophy. In the face of disagreement, we should aggregate everyone’s judgments, and defer to this aggregation. I argue for a new approach.
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Abstract The following, broadly conciliatory, line on peer disagreement is very popular in current philosophy. In the face of disagreement, we should aggregate everyone’s judgments, and defer to this aggregation. I argue for a new approach.
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