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Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment. [PDF]

Philos Explor, 2019
I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs.
Townsend LC.
europepmc   +4 more sources

Desiderata for Rational, Non-doxastic Faith [PDF]

Sophia, 2022
AbstractAccording to an increasingly popular view known as non-doxasticism, religious faith need not include belief, but only some cognitively weaker attitude. This view comes with great promises, as it offers a way for the agnostic to partake in religion. My concern is how such a non-doxastic faith might be understood as a rational attitude.
Carl-Johan Palmqvist
openaire   +2 more sources

Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality. [PDF]

Synthese, 2021
A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of
Eder AA.
europepmc   +3 more sources

On the rationality of semi-secular simultaneity: a non-doxastic interpretation of the seemingly inconsistent worldviews of some Swedish ‘nones’

Religious Studies, 2022
AbstractProponents of religious non-doxasticism standardly aim to show how a commitment to traditional religion can be rational in the absence of religious belief. We demonstrate how the non-doxastic framework can be given a much wider application. In a study on Swedish semi-secularity, sociologist Ann af Burén has discovered a pattern where subjects ...
Carl-Johan Palmqvist, Francis Jonbäck
openaire   +5 more sources

Rational Slack and Doxastic Grain

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
ABSTRACTThis paper argues for granular permissivism, roughly the view that evidence is sometimes permissive between doxastic attitudes at different levels of grain. The argument identifies three sources of rational slack between granularly differing doxastic states: doxastic tidiness, safety, and evidential responsiveness.
Bradford Saad
openaire   +2 more sources

In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions. [PDF]

Neuroethics, 2012
Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in ...
Bortolotti L.
europepmc   +6 more sources

Alston on the Rationality of Doxastic Practices

Faith and Philosophy, 2010
W. Hasker
openaire   +2 more sources

What is the aim of models in formal epistemology?

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2022
It is certainly well accepted that formal models play a key role in scientific job. Its use goes from natural sciences like physics and even to social sciences like economics and politics.
Matheus de Lima Rui
doaj   +1 more source

Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe

Episteme, 2023
Evidentialism as an account of theoretical rationality is a popular and well-defended position. However, recently, it's been argued that misleading higher-order evidence (HOE) – that is, evidence about one's evidence or about one's cognitive ...
Wade Munroe
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Bounded emotionality and our doxastic norms

Inquiry, 2022
In this paper I have two main aims. My first aim is to introduce the notion of bounded emotionality. This notion is the analogue of that of bounded rationality in behavioural economics. Bounded rationality says, roughly, that human beings are cognitively
Winnie Ma
semanticscholar   +1 more source