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2023
Abstract Chapter 2 is concerned with the distinction that most contemporary epistemologists express by distinguishing between “propositional” and “doxastic” justification. The goal is to develop an account of this distinction that applies, not just to full or outright beliefs, but also to partial credences—and indeed, in principle, to ...
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Abstract Chapter 2 is concerned with the distinction that most contemporary epistemologists express by distinguishing between “propositional” and “doxastic” justification. The goal is to develop an account of this distinction that applies, not just to full or outright beliefs, but also to partial credences—and indeed, in principle, to ...
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Epistemic and Doxastic Contents
Impossible Worlds, 2019The case for making belief states the primary focus of our analysis and for including impossible worlds in that analysis is outlined in this chapter. This allows the reader to deny various closure principles, although this won’t help defeat worries about
Francesco Berto, M. Jago
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Sexist Beliefs in a Sexist World: Exploring the Causal Role of Sexism in Sexist Beliefs
EpistemeThe claim that prejudice causes prejudiced beliefs is a familiar one. Call it the causal claim. In this paper, I turn to sexism and sexist beliefs to explore the causal claim within the context of current debates in the ethics of beliefs about moral ...
Anna Brinkerhoff
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2012
The instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is the view according to which beliefs, or doxastic states generally, are epistemically rational insofar as they promote the achievement of an epistemic goal, and they are epistemically irrational to the extent that they fail to promote such a goal.
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The instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is the view according to which beliefs, or doxastic states generally, are epistemically rational insofar as they promote the achievement of an epistemic goal, and they are epistemically irrational to the extent that they fail to promote such a goal.
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Energy-related behaviour and rebound when rationality, self-interest and willpower are limited
Nature Energy, 2021Filippos Exadaktylos +1 more
exaly
Public Group Announcements and Trust in Doxastic Logic
Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, 2019Elise Perrotin +3 more
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Moore’s Paradox and Doxastic Innocence
Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific PhilosophyMaciej Tarnowski
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Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism
Synthese, 2014Karl Schafer
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