Results 11 to 20 of about 779,678 (178)
Crítica, 2018 Moderate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment ...
Nicolás Lo Guercio
doaj +3 more sources
, 2018 In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we ...
Basu, Rima, Schroeder, Mark
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Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame [PDF]
, 2020 I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved,
Schmidt, Sebastian
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The old gods as a live possibility: on the rational feasibility of non-doxastic paganism
Religious Studies, 2022 AbstractPagan revivalism is a growing trend in the contemporary religious landscape. Is it possible to be a neopagan without disregarding the demands of reason? While outright belief in the old gods seems out of the question, I argue that polytheism represents a live epistemic possibility, and that non-doxastic paganism is therefore a viable option ...
openaire +1 more source
Epistemic Peer Disagreement [PDF]
, 2019 We offer a critical survey of the most discussed accounts of epistemic peer disagreement that are found in the recent literature.
Ferrari, Filippo +1 more
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology [PDF]
, 2022 Can there be knowledge and rational belief in the absence of a rational degree of confidence? Yes, and cases of "mistuned knowledge" demonstrate this. In this paper we leverage this normative possibility in support of advancing our understanding of the ...
Lee, Matthew Brandon, Silva Jr, Paul
core
A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism [PDF]
, 2021 Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single ...
Jackson, Elizabeth
core
The Moral and Evidential Requirements of Faith [PDF]
, 2020 © 2019 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.What is the relationship between faith and evidence? It is often claimed that faith requires going beyond evidence.
Malcolm, Finlay
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Is higher-order evidence evidence? [PDF]
, 2020 Suppose we learn that we have a poor track record in forming beliefs rationally, or that a brilliant colleague thinks that we believe P irrationally. Does such input require us to revise those beliefs whose rationality is in question?
Tal, Eyal
core
Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion? [PDF]
, 2015 Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly
Porcher, José Eduardo
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