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The Rationality of Belonging: Cognitive Crises and Epistemic Clash within a Science and Religion Belief System

Zygon
Doxastic conflicts are a pervasive feature of the modern human experience. We form beliefs on various interrelated subjects that, not rarely, conflict with each other. In this article, I argue that when an individual experiences a crisis between doxastic
Marcelo Cabral
doaj   +2 more sources

Responding to the Religious Reasons of Others: Resonance and Non-Reducitve Religious Pluralism [PDF]

, 2013
Call a belief ”non-negotiable’ if one cannot abandon the belief without the abandonment of one’s religious perspective. Although non-negotiable beliefs can logically exclude other perspectives, a non-reductive approach to religious pluralism can help to ...
Legenhausen, Muhammad
core   +1 more source

Unacknowledged Permissivism [PDF]

, 2020
Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence.
Smith, Julia Jael
core  

Truth, Communication, and Democracy

International Journal of Communication, 2019
This article argues that truth is vital to deliberative democracy and to communication as an academic discipline. Our definition of truth is critical realist in nature—that is, it refers to an ontologically objective reality.
Douglas Porpora, Seif Sekalala
doaj   +2 more sources

Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience

Higher-Order Evidence, 2019
It seems obvious that when higher-order evidence makes it rational for one to doubt that one’s own belief on some matter is rational, this can undermine the rationality of that belief. This is known as higher-order defeat.
Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat [PDF]

, 2019
Titelbaum Oxford studies in epistemology, 2015) has recently argued that the Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat.
Skipper, Mattias
core  

Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths [PDF]

, 2018
According to the Path Principle, it is permissible to expand your set of beliefs iff (and because) the evidence you possess provides adequate support for such beliefs. If there is no path from here to there, you cannot add a belief to your belief set. If
A Brueckner, A Coates, A Steglich-Petersen, B Brewer, C Littlejohn, C Littlejohn, C Littlejohn, C Travis, D Smithies, E Conee, E Conee, GEM Anscombe, J Comesana, J Corns, J Fantl, J Gibbons, J Hyman, J Ichikawa, J McDowell, J Sutton, K McCain, M Alvarez, M Schroeder, M Titelbaum, M Titelbaum, M Tye, P Unger, R Fumerton, R Fumerton, R Neta, S Schellenberg, T Burge, T Dougherty, T Williamson, V Mitova   +34 more
core   +1 more source

Debunking the Climate Sceptic and the Threat of Self‐Defeat

Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Cultural cognition is the thesis that laypersons' factual beliefs about politically important issues are often shaped by their political values. The question, then, is whether a layperson who believes in anthropogenic climate change should doubt her beliefs insofar as they might be influenced by values.
Léna Mudry
wiley   +1 more source

How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism [PDF]

, 2019
Rationality is intrapersonally permissive just in case there are multiple doxastic states that one agent may be rational in holding at a given time, given some body of evidence.
Li, Han
core  

Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology

Synthese, 2019
Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments.
Matthew Jope
semanticscholar   +1 more source