Results 41 to 50 of about 779,678 (178)
The Illusion of Permissive Balancing
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The standard view among philosophers of normativity is that practical reasons balance permissively (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible actions, either action is rational), while epistemic reasons balance prohibitively (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible doxastic attitudes, neither attitude may be rationally formed).
Jordan Scott
wiley +1 more source
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters [PDF]
, 2019 In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues.
Jackson, Elizabeth
core
Dilating and contracting arbitrarily [PDF]
, 2022 Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence.
Builes, David +2 more
core
An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism [PDF]
, 2020 Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth ...
Sylvan, Kurt L.
core +1 more source
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We are valuing beings, beings who possess the capacity to value things. But what is it “to value” something? The most common accounts in the literature hold that to value an item is either to have a first‐order or a second‐order desire toward it; or to believe that item to be valuable; or to care about that item; or to have a combination of ...
Mauro Rossi, Christine Tappolet
wiley +1 more source
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence [PDF]
Evidentialism is the thesis, roughly, that one’s beliefs should fit one’s evidence. The enkratic principle is the thesis, roughly, that one’s beliefs should "line up" with one’s beliefs about which beliefs one ought to have.
Skipper, Mattias
core +1 more source
Culpable Ignorance and Causal Deviance
Ratio, Volume 39, Issue 1, Page 26-34, March 2026.ABSTRACT I argue that tracing theorists of culpability for ignorant wrongdoing should reject the widely accepted principle that culpability for ignorant wrongdoing should always be traced through culpability for the ignorance itself. Two kinds of cases are considered in which culpability for ignorant wrongdoing ultimately traces back to culpability for
Thomas A. Yates
wiley +1 more source
If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It [PDF]
, 2020 I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their ...
Helton, Grace
core
Can Fictionalists Have Faith? [PDF]
, 2017 This article has been published in a revised form in Religioius Studies, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412517000063. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works.
Alston +8 more
core +4 more sources