Results 51 to 60 of about 779,678 (178)

Does reflection reduce the epistemic side‐effect effect? A new challenge to error accounts

open access: yesMind &Language, Volume 41, Issue 1, Page 88-118, February 2026.
The epistemic side‐effect effect consists of an asymmetric pattern of knowledge attributions in harm and help cases, paralleling the Knobe effect for intentionality attributions. Error‐based accounts suggest the asymmetries arise from performance errors in harm cases. We challenge this claim with three new experimental studies designed to reduce errors.
Bartosz Maćkiewicz   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Awareness and equilibrium [PDF]

open access: yes
There has been a recent surge of interest among economists in developing models of doxastic states that can account for some aspects of human cognitive limitations that are ignored by standard formal models, such as awareness.
Hill, Brian
core  

Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
Orthodox Bayesianism is a highly idealized theory of how we ought to live our epistemic lives. One of the most widely discussed idealizations is that of logical omniscience: the assumption that an agent’s degrees of belief must be probabilistically ...
Bjerring, Jens Christian   +1 more
core  

Explain Yourself: The Ethics of Soliciting Advice

open access: yes
Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
Jordan Desmond
wiley   +1 more source

Hybrid Deference, Hybrid Chance

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 1, Page 214-233, January 2026.
ABSTRACT If you learn about one kind of chance and nothing else, then you should defer to those chances. But what if you learn about more than one kind of chance? In such “hybrid” cases, familiar chance‐credence principles, like the Principal Principle, go silent when they should intuitively speak.
Alexander Meehan
wiley   +1 more source

Two types of epistemic instrumentalism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
Epistemic instrumentalism views epistemic norms and epistemic normativity as essentially involving the instrumental relation between means and ends. It construes notions like epistemic normativity, norms, and rationality, as forms of instrumental or ...
Côté-Bouchard, Charles
core  

Teaching Students to Understand Knowledge: Stress‐Testing the ‘Justified True Belief Account’ for Critical Thinking

open access: yesFuture in Educational Research, Volume 3, Issue 4, Page 569-579, December 2025.
ABSTRACT This conceptual essay, grounded in a close reading of Plato's Theaetetus, argues that before educators can effectively operationalise critical thinking as the rigorous evaluation ('stress‐testing') of competing knowledge claims, university students must first understand foundational epistemological principles rooted in Plato's tripartite ...
Gerry Dunne
wiley   +1 more source

Lessons for Religious Dialogue from a Philosophical Disagreement: Alston and Schellenberg on Religious Commitment [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
A disagreement between two philosophers, William Alston and J. L. Schellenberg, on the matter of religious commitment serves to exemplify an important difference between religious believers and religious sceptics.
Dastmalchian, Amir
core  

From modality to millianism

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 59, Issue 4, Page 851-872, December 2025.
Abstract A new argument is offered which proceeds through epistemic possibility (for all S knows, p), cutting a trail from modality to Millianism, the controversial thesis that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its bearer. New definitions are provided for various epistemic modal notions.
Nathan Salmón
wiley   +1 more source

Sleeping Beauty and the demands of non‐ideal rationality

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 59, Issue 4, Page 1072-1092, December 2025.
Abstract If an agent can't live up to the demands of ideal rationality, fallback norms come into play that take into account the agent's limitations. A familiar human limitation is our tendency to lose information. How should we compensate for this tendency?
Wolfgang Schwarz
wiley   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy