Results 81 to 90 of about 779,678 (178)

Suspension as a mood

Philosophical Psychology
Suspension of judgment is a ubiquitous phenomenon in our lives. It is also relevant for several debates in contemporary epistemology (e.g., evidentialism/pragmatism; peer-disagreement/higher-order evidence; inquiry).
Benoit Guilielmo, Artūrs Logins
semanticscholar   +1 more source

The Precautionary Principle and Expert Disagreement. [PDF]

Erkenntnis, 2021
Elkin L.
europepmc   +1 more source

Scientific experiments beyond surprise and beauty. [PDF]

Eur J Philos Sci, 2023
Kozlov A.
europepmc   +1 more source

Extending Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Accommodating Iterated Beliefs And Ramsey Conditionals Within DDL [PDF]

, 1997
In this paper we distinguish between various kinds of doxastic theories. One distinction is between informal and formal doxastic theories. AGM-type theories of belief change are of the former kind, while Hintikka’s logic of knowledge and belief is of the
Lindström, Sten, Rabinowicz, Wiodek
core  

Judgment aggregation, discursive dilemma and reflective equilibrium: Neural language models as self-improving doxastic agents. [PDF]

Front Artif Intell, 2022
Betz G, Richardson K.
europepmc   +1 more source

Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement. [PDF]

Erkenntnis, 2023
Melchior G.
europepmc   +1 more source

The Normativity of Doxastic Correctness [PDF]

, 2018
It is widely maintained that doxastic norms that govern how people should believe can be explained by the truism that belief is governed by the correctness norm: believing p is correct if and only if p.
Ho, Tsung-Hsing
core  

Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind [PDF]

, 2020
This chapter locates our overall approach within the dialectic of contemporary philosophical debates and provides an overall framework for discussion. First, I introduce the problem of mental normativity.
Schmidt, Sebastian
core  

An Argument for the Prima Facie Wrongness of Having Propositional Faith [PDF]

, 2019
W. K. Clifford famously argued that it is “wrong always, everywhere and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” Though the spirit of this claim resonates with me, the letter does not.
Lovering, Rob
core  

Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality. [PDF]

Acta Anal, 2021
Field C.
europepmc   +1 more source