Results 91 to 100 of about 1,340 (195)
Are We Causally Redundant? Eliminativism and the no-Self View [PDF]
Some friends of eliminativism about ordinary material objects such as tables or statues think that we need to make exceptions. In this article, I am interested in Trenton Merricks’ claim that we need to make an exception for us, conscious beings, and ...
Benovsky, Jiri
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Kognitivna istraživanja religije pokušavaju da objasne religijska uverenja. Ipak, mnogi antropolozi, psiholozi i filozofi kritikuju koncepte "vere" ili "uverenja" kao takve.
Jonathan A. Lanman
doaj
Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox
AbstractJohn Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G.E.Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining butIdo not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that ofEllie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd.
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Constituting Emotional Phenomena—A Mach-Influenced Empiricist Perspective
The theory of psychological construction disputes the views of those basic emotion theorists who hold that the coordinated physiological, affective, cognitive, and behavioral features of basic emotions are initiated by the activation of affect programs.
Peter Zachar
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In this article, the author examines two kinds of eliminativisms in the philosophy of mind – eliminative materialism and functional eliminativism. He shows that mature neuroscience has to explain phenomena which are denoted by the concepts »perception«, »mind« or »consciousness« and that these concepts are not introduced as explanations of something ...
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BMCR Review - Ugo Zilioli (2025), Eliminativism in Ancient Philosophy, Bloomsbury Academic.
This is my review of Ugo Zilioli's 2025 book on Eliminativism in Ancient Philosophy (Bloomsbury, 2024)
Güremen, Refik
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From naturalness to materiality: reimagining philosophy of scientific classification. [PDF]
Ludwig D.
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Reviewed Publication: Matthew J. Cull: What Gender Should Be. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2024, pp. 234.
Danny Weltman
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Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions [PDF]
In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism—the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons: a reason for an agent to have an ...
Schultz, Conner
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The exclusionary approach to consciousness. [PDF]
Paßler M.
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