Results 61 to 70 of about 1,340 (195)

Eliminativismo semantico e competenza lessicale

Rivista di Estetica, 2018
According to Meaning Eliminativism [ME] (Recanati 2004), an explanation of our lexical competence does not need to associate the entries of the lexicon with a set of stable “meanings” or “semantic potentials”.
Fabrizio Calzavarini
doaj   +1 more source

Lo statuto metodologico dei contenuti intenzionali

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2019
The philosophy of mind debate is characterized by increasing consensus regarding a new type of eliminativism, also known as the radical enactivist theory of mind.
Silvano Zipoli Caiani
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Ontology After Folk Psychology; or, Why Eliminativists Should Be Mental Fictionalists

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 1-11, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Mental fictionalism holds that folk psychology should be regarded as a kind of fiction. The present version gives a Lewisian prefix semantics for mentalistic discourse, where roughly, a mentalistic sentence “p” is true iff “p” is deducible from the folk psychological fiction.
Ted Parent
wiley   +1 more source

How to Think About Tacit (or Implicit) Beliefs

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 335-345, March 2026.
ABSTRACT This paper defends a novel theory of tacit belief (sometimes called “implicit belief”). After providing some background and taxonomy, I argue that dispositionalist theories of belief fail to provide a good account of tacit beliefs; this failure gives us a reason to reject those dispositionalist theories.
Andrew Moon
wiley   +1 more source

Meta-scientific eliminativism: A reconsideration of Chomsky's review of Skinner

, 2007
The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the ...
Collins, John, John Collins
core   +1 more source

Phasal Eliminativism, Anti-Lexicalism, and the Status of the Unarticulated

Biolinguistics, 2016
This paper explores the prospect that grammatical expressions are propositionally whole and psychologically plausible, leading to the explanatory burden being placed on syntax rather than pragmatic processes, with the latter crucially bearing the feature
Elliot Murphy
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Properly Speaking, Sir Isaac Newton Was the First Perceptual Psychologist and, Therefore, the First Psychologist

Color Research &Application, Volume 51, Issue 1, January/February 2026.
Newton’s insight that “the rays are not colored” anticipated a constructivist view of perception in which physical stimuli provide input but perceptual qualities arise from neural processing. Framed by Newton’s view, early sensory psychology and modern neuroscience converged on the conclusion that color is an internally generated percept, shaped by ...
Billy R. Wooten, Billy R. Hammond
wiley   +1 more source

Model‐Based Semantics: Doing Without Meaning Constitution

Metaphilosophy, Volume 57, Issue 1-2, Page 103-118, January 2026.
Abstract This paper introduces a model‐based account of meaning, arguing that meaning properties reside in models rather than in the external world. Building on this view, it explores how such an instrumentalist framework can engage critically with various concerns raised by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Kripke[nstein]—each of whom voiced scepticism toward ...
Pietro Salis
wiley   +1 more source

Changing “Sex”

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 3-4, Page 407-422, July 2025.
Abstract Can you change sex? Can you change the meaning of the concept “sex”? Does changing “sex” make changing sex possible? Would changing “sex” to make changing sex not only possible but also easy be a good thing? Might it, as some argue, help us bring about a new way of thinking and of acting that liberates us from the logic of heteronormativity ...
Neil Gascoigne
wiley   +1 more source

Conceptual engineering, language use, and the neutral implementation challenge

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 3-4, Page 373-388, July 2025.
Abstract Conceptual engineering projects have been targeted by what is known as the “implementation challenge,” which calls for an account of how it is possible to change meanings, given that we have no control over the complex ways in which meaning supervenes (for example) on patterns of use.
Delia Belleri
wiley   +1 more source