Results 81 to 90 of about 566 (175)

Consciousness and mental causation: Contemporary empirical cases for epiphenomenalism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
In its classical form, epiphenomenalism is the view that conscious mental events have no physical effects: while physical events cause mental events, the opposite is never true.
Kozuch, Benjamin
core  

Rejecting epiphobia [PDF]

open access: yes, 2021
Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory.
Baysan, Umut
core  

The Epiphenomenalism Charge as an External Objection to Anomalous Monism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2011
The paper is a critical reaction to M. Grygianiec’s discussion of the status of the epiphenomenalism objection to anomalous monism. Grygianiec argues that the objection does not arise for Davidson if one takes his nominalism seriously.
Paprzycka, Katarzyna
core  

A quasi-materialist, quasi-dualist solution to the mind-body problem

open access: yesKriterion, 2006
If the mental can affect, or be affected by, the physical, then the mental must itself be physical. Otherwise the physical world would not be explanatorily closed. But it is closed.
John-Michael Kuczynski
doaj  

Who should fear type epiphenomenalism? [PDF]

open access: yes, 2013
The causal exclusion argument purports to show that various forms of nonreductive physicalism in philosophy of mind (including especially Davidson’s anomalous monism) inevitably lead to type epiphenomenalism, i.e.
Posłajko, Krzysztof
core  

EPIPHENOMENALISM AND CROSS-REALIZATION INDUCTION

open access: yesGrazer Philosophische studien, 2002
Contains fulltext : 130824_pub.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)
openaire   +3 more sources

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy