Results 11 to 20 of about 96,163 (267)
, 2017 In almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck. An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets happen to win.
Carter, J. Adam +1 more
core +3 more sources
Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation
Philosophical Studies, 2023 AbstractThis paper introduces three new concepts: epistemic health, epistemic immunity, and epistemic inoculation. Epistemic health is a measure of how well an entity (e.g. person, community, nation) is functioning with regard to various epistemic goods or ideals. It is constituted by many different factors (e.g. possessing true beliefs, being disposed
Adam Piovarchy, Scott Siskind
openaire +2 more sources
Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification [PDF]
Synthese, 2016 If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good ...
Patrick Bondy, Duncan Pritchard
openaire +3 more sources
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
Synthese, 2022 AbstractIn this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by ...
openaire +2 more sources
Epistemic justification and epistemic luck [PDF]
Synthese, 2017 Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other.
openaire +1 more source
Stereotypes, Epistemic Dilemmas, and Epistemic Dispositions [PDF]
, 2021 People sometimes face an epistemic dilemma with regards to stereotyping. We harbor a stereotype that reflects something of social reality, e.g., high rates of criminal involvement among members of a certain social group. But if we apply the stereotype when making judgments about individuals, we make certain mistakes, e.g., failing to notice positive ...
openaire +2 more sources
Epistemic Theodicy, Epistemic Evil, and Epistemic Responsibility
Religions, 2023 The paper explores the concept of epistemic theodicy and strengthens an argument that reconciles human fallibility with the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God. This argument is grounded in epistemic responsibility, emphasizing our epistemic autonomy.
openaire +2 more sources
Epistemic and Non-epistemic Values in Earthquake Engineering
Science and Engineering Ethics, 2023 AbstractThe importance of epistemic values in science is universally recognized, whereas the role of non-epistemic values is sometimes considered disputable. It has often been argued that non-epistemic values are more relevant in applied sciences, where the goals are often practical and not merely scientific.
L. Zanetti, D. Chiffi, L. Petrini
openaire +3 more sources
Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation
, 2022 This paper introduces three new concepts: epistemic health, epistemic immunity, and epistemic inoculation. Epistemic health is a measure of how well an entity (e.g. person, community, nation) is functioning with regard to various epistemic goods or ideals. It is constituted by many different factors (e.g. possessing true beliefs, being disposed to make
openaire +1 more source
Epistemic pluralism, epistemic relativism and ‘hinge’ epistemology [PDF]
, 2017 According to Paul Boghossian (2006, 73) a core tenet of epistemic relativism is what he calls epistemic pluralism, according to which (i) ‘there are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems’, but (ii) ‘no facts by virtue of ...
J. Adam Carter, Carter, J. Adam
core +1 more source