Results 261 to 270 of about 346,274 (310)
I'm still here and my opinion matters: a scoping review on the experience of epistemic injustice among people living with dementia. [PDF]
Curr PsycholCalabrese L +9 more
europepmc +1 more source
Who gets to decide? Matters arising from Robinson et al. (2024), "Can people with longstanding bulimia nervosa suffer from severe and enduring eating disorder? A qualitative study". [PDF]
J Eat DisordDowns J.
europepmc +1 more source
Development and Evaluation of a Hallucination Awareness Scale for Healthcare Professionals and its impact on diagnostic confidence. [PDF]
Front Digit HealthTandon U.
europepmc +1 more source
Epistemic principles, epistemic circularity and the ultimate epistemic goal.
openaire +1 more source
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
Journal of Semantics, 2006
The present paper offers a contrastive examination of French items that require some knowledge of the speaker and items that require some ignorance. We relate this difference in a systematic way to the well?known problem of ?identifiability'in epistemic logic.
Jayez, Jacques, Tovena, Lucia
openaire +1 more source
The present paper offers a contrastive examination of French items that require some knowledge of the speaker and items that require some ignorance. We relate this difference in a systematic way to the well?known problem of ?identifiability'in epistemic logic.
Jayez, Jacques, Tovena, Lucia
openaire +1 more source
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust
Social Epistemology, 2012Miranda Fricker has introduced the insightful notion of epistemic injustice in the philosophical debate, thus bridging concerns of social epistemology with questions that arise in the area of social and cultural studies. I concentrate my analysis of her treatment of testimonial injustice. According to Fricker, the central cases of testimonial injustice
openaire +1 more source
Epistemic Desiderata and Epistemic Pluralism
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2010In this article I argue that Alston's recent meta-epistemological approach in terms of epistemic desiderata is not as epistemically plural as he claims it to be. After some preliminary remarks, I briefly recapitulate Alston's epistemic desiderata approach.
openaire +2 more sources