Results 341 to 350 of about 445,002 (378)

Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust

Social Epistemology, 2012
Miranda Fricker has introduced the insightful notion of epistemic injustice in the philosophical debate, thus bridging concerns of social epistemology with questions that arise in the area of social and cultural studies. I concentrate my analysis of her treatment of testimonial injustice. According to Fricker, the central cases of testimonial injustice
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The cognitive empire, politics of knowledge and African intellectual productions: reflections on struggles for epistemic freedom and resurgence of decolonisation in the twenty-first century

, 2020
What has been the contribution of African intellectuals to postcolonial and decolonial scholarship? This question arises because there is emphasis on privileging works of Diasporic scholars from the Middle East and South Asia for postcolonialism and ...
S. Ndlovu-Gatsheni
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Epistemic Desiderata and Epistemic Pluralism

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2010
In this article I argue that Alston's recent meta-epistemological approach in terms of epistemic desiderata is not as epistemically plural as he claims it to be. After some preliminary remarks, I briefly recapitulate Alston's epistemic desiderata approach.
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The Epistemic and the Zetetic

Philosophical Review, 2020
Call the norms of inquiry zetetic norms. How are zetetic norms related to epistemic norms? At first glance, they seem quite closely connected. Aren't epistemic norms norms that bind inquirers qua inquirers?
Jane Friedman
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Epistemically Different Epistemic Peers

Topoi, 2019
For over a decade now epistemologists have been thinking about the peer disagreement problem of whether a person is reasonable in not lowering her confidence in her belief P when she comes to accept that she has an epistemic peer on P who disbelieves P.
Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro, Bryan Frances
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Epistemic Permissiveness

Contemporary Epistemology, 2019
A rational person doesn't believe just anything. There are limits on what it is rational to believe. How wide are these limits? That's the main question that interests me here. But a secondary question immediately arises: What factors impose these limits?
Roger White
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Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2021
AbstractEpistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist ...
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The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice

Essays in Philosophy, 2021
M. Brito
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement

Contemporary Epistemology, 2019
Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions—and always with ...
T. Kelly
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Race, Empire, and Epistemic Exclusion: Or the Structures of Sociological Thought

, 2020
This essay analyzes racialized exclusions in sociology through a focus on sociology’s deep epistemic structures. These structures dictate what counts as social scientific knowledge and who can produce it.
J. Go
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