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Epistemic Agency: A Link Between Assessment, Knowledge and Society
Higher EducationIn this conceptual article, we discuss the idea of students’ epistemic agency as an overlooked link between assessment, knowledge and society. We transcend the contemporary discourses around assessment that focus on its authenticity and student ...
Laura Ketonen, Juuso Nieminen
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Willpower and Epistemic Agency
2022Abstract This chapter applies the lessons about the two distinct forms of epistemic agency from the previous chapters to the issue of self-control. Traditionally, the literature distinguishes between agentive and effortful forms of self-control like willpower, and environment-manipulating ‘tying to the mast’ strategies, which are ...
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Southwest Philosophy Review, 2004
Who Knows? According to contemporary analytic epistemology only individuals do. This individualistic bias is present in standard analyses of knowledge. The “S” of “S knows that p” is always an individual cognizer. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration. This form of epistemic individualism,
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Who Knows? According to contemporary analytic epistemology only individuals do. This individualistic bias is present in standard analyses of knowledge. The “S” of “S knows that p” is always an individual cognizer. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration. This form of epistemic individualism,
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Philosophical Issues, 2013
There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions.
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There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions.
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Epistemic Agency and the Generality Problem
Philosophical Topics, 2017I present and motivate a new solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. I suggest that we shift our focus from process-types that can be characterized independently of a subject's epistemic concerns to process-types that play important roles in the life of the epistemic agent. Once we do so, a simple, promising solution suggests itself: the C-
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Epistemic Agency Under Oppression
Philosophical Papers, 2020The literature on epistemic injustice has been helpful for highlighting some of the epistemic harms that have long troubled those working in area studies that concern oppressed populations.
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Sexual Consent and Epistemic Agency
2021AbstractIn “Sexual Consent and Epistemic Agency,” Jennifer Lackey examines sexual consent in the context of the widely accepted thesis that knowledge is sufficient for epistemically permissible action; that is, the view according to which if someone knows a given proposition, then it is epistemically permissible for this person to act on it.
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Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2001Dans le cadre d'une epistemologie fondee sur l'existence de vertus intellectuelles, l'A. interroge la possibilite d'une explication de l'action epistemique en termes de vertus. Definissant un principe schematique comme critere ou analyse de la connaissance, l'A.
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Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2014In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: (1) S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and (2) Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia.
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Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2020What is going on when we explain someone’s belief by appeal to stereotypes associated with her gender, sexuality, race, or class? In this paper I try to motivate two claims. First, such explanations involve an overlooked form of epistemic injustice, which I call ‘explanatory injustice’. Second, the language of reasons helps us shed light on the ways in
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