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Invited commentary: does social concordance matter? [PDF]
Anderson JN.
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Decolonising informed consent in global mental health research. [PDF]
ElChaar S +3 more
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Digital Activism, Legal Reform, and Islamic Feminist Resistance in Saudi Arabia
Zakarriya J.
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2021
AbstractDisrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual
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AbstractDisrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual
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Confabulation and epistemic authority
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2018AbstractMahr & Csibra (M&C) claim that episodic remembering's autonoetic character serves as an indicator of epistemic authority. This proposal is difficult to reconcile with the existence of confabulation errors – where participants fabricate memories of experiences that never happened to them.
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Negotiating Epistemic Authority
2017Why do we trust what other people say, and form beliefs on the basis of their speech? One answer: they are taken to have epistemic authority. Intuitively this means that the other person (or institution, or group) is taken to be authoritative in what they say, at least with respect to a particular domain. Here, we want to claim that there are (at least)
Elin McCready, Grégoire Winterstein
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, EPISTEMIC PREEMPTION, AND THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
Episteme, 2016ABSTRACTHow does the intellectually virtuous person respond to the beliefs of those whom they judge to be their epistemic superiors? Linda Zagzebski argues that we ought to take the beliefs of those we judge to be our epistemic authorities as a preemptive reason to believe the same.
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