Results 1 to 10 of about 5,712 (282)
Appropriate Belief Without Evidence [PDF]
, 2015 In this paper I defend a version of Wittgensteininan contextualism. This is a view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because evidence cannot be adduced in their favour.
Ashton, Natalie Alana
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Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin [PDF]
, 2008 The distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ value concepts, and its importance to ethical theory, has been an active topic in recent meta-ethics. This paper defends three claims regarding the parallel issue about thick and thin epistemic concepts.
Bach Kent +15 more
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Maximally Epistemic Interpretations of the Quantum State and Contextuality [PDF]
Physical Review Letters, 2013 v1: 4 pages, revTeX4.1, some overlap with arXiv:1207.7192. v2: Changes in response to referees including revised proof of theorem 1, more rigorous discussion of measure theoretic assumptions and extra introductory ...
Leifer, Matthew S., Maroney, O. J. E.
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Linguistic Evidence and Substantive Epistemic Contextualism
Logos & Episteme, 2021 Epistemic contextualism (EC) is the thesis that the standards that must be met by a knowledge claimant vary with (especially conversational) contexts of utterance. Thus construed, EC may concern only knowledge claims (“Semantic EC”), or else the knowledge relation itself (“Substantive EC”).
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Gradability and Knowledge [PDF]
, 2017 Epistemic contextualism (‘EC’), the view that the truth-values of knowledge attributions may vary with the context of ascription, has a variety of different linguistic implementations.
Michael, Blome-Tillmann
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Pluralism about Knowledge [PDF]
, 2017 In this paper I consider the prospects for pluralism about knowledge, that is, the view that there is a plurality of knowledge relations. After a brief overview of some views that entail a sort of pluralism about knowledge, I focus on a particular kind ...
Berit Brogaard +34 more
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Three things to do with knowledge ascriptions [PDF]
, 2021 Any good theory of knowledge ascriptions should explain and predict our judgments about their felicity. I argue that any such explanation must take into account a distinction between three ways of using knowledge ascriptions: to suggest acceptance of the
Lossau, Tammo
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals [PDF]
, 2020 A plausible principle about the felicitous use of indicative conditionals says that there is something strange about asserting an indicative conditional when you know whether its antecedent is true.
Holguín, Ben
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Skepticism, Contextualism, Externalism and Modality
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2006 In this paper, I argue for the following claims. Contextualist strategies to tame or localize epistemic skepticism are hopeless if contextualist factors are construed internalistically.
Ron Wilburn
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Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Indexing [PDF]
, 2018 In this paper I focus on a recently discussed phenomenon illustrated by sentences containing predicates of taste: the phenomenon of " perspectival plurality " , whereby sentences containing two or more predicates of taste have readings according to which
Zeman, Dan
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