Results 11 to 20 of about 582,642 (294)
Computing lower and upper expectations under epistemic independence
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de Campos, Cassio Polpo +1 more
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Cooperation in Games and Epistemic Readings of Independence-Friendly Sentences [PDF]
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Fausto Barbero
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Epistemic independence for imprecise probabilities
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Paolo Vicig
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Experts, Evidence, and Epistemic Independence
Throughout his work on the rationality of epistemic dependence, John Hardwig makes the striking observation that he believes many things for which he possesses no evidence (1985, 335; 1991, 693; 1994, 83). While he could imagine collecting for himself the relevant evidence for some of his beliefs, the vastness of the world and constraints of time and ...
Ben Almassi
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Epistemic Independence Struggles: A Comparative Analysis of Two Indigenous Universities in Peru and Ecuador [PDF]
This chapter1 attempts to develop some possible answers to the following questions: How can we explain the rise of indigenous universities in Latin America since the 1990s? Why did this happen now and not before? What does it mean in terms of epistemic breaks in relation to the traditional, dominant (Western) patterns of knowledge production?
Lenin Arturo Valencia Arroyo
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Explanatory Independence and Epistemic Interdependence: A Case Study of the Optimality Approach [PDF]
AbstractThe value of optimality modeling has long been a source of contention amongst population biologists.
A. Potochnik
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Abstract We define a concept of a QM-model. The true theorem in QM is a statement which is true in all QM-models. In some QM-models the Bell’s theorem can be proved (e.g. in the standard model of QM) while in other QM-models the Bell’s theorem cannot be proved (e.g. in the hybrid-epistemic model of QM).
J. Souček
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The Value of Independence between Experts: Epistemic Autonomy and Different Perspectives
Abstract I offer two interpretations of independence between experts: (i) independence as deciding autonomously, and (ii) independence as having different perspectives. I argue that when experts are grouped together, independence of both kinds is valuable for the same reason: they reduce the likelihood of erroneous consensus by enabling a greater ...
Jack Wright
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Handling epistemic and aleatory uncertainties in probabilistic circuits [PDF]
When collaborating with an AI system, we need to assess when to trust its recommendations. If we mistakenly trust it in regions where it is likely to err, catastrophic failures may occur, hence the need for Bayesian approaches for probabilistic reasoning
Federico Cerutti +3 more
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The epistemic value of independent lies: false analogies and equivocations [PDF]
AbstractHere I critically assess an argument put forward by Kuorikoski et al. (Br J Philos Sci, 61(3):541–567, 2010) for the epistemic import of model-based robustness analysis. I show that this argument is not sound since the sort of probabilistic independence on which it relies is unfeasible.
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