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Credal networks under epistemic irrelevance [PDF]
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 2017 A credal network under epistemic irrelevance is a generalised type of Bayesian network that relaxes its two main building blocks. On the one hand, the local probabilities are allowed to be partially specified. On the other hand, the assessments of independence do not have to hold exactly.
De Bock, Jasper
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Credal networks under epistemic irrelevance using sets of desirable gambles [PDF]
, 2013 We present a new approach to credal networks, which are graphical models that generalise Bayesian nets to deal with imprecise probabilities. Instead of applying the commonly used notion of strong independence, we replace it by the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance.
De Bock, Jasper, de Cooman, Gert
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Reintroducing credal networks under epistemic irrelevance [PDF]
, 2016 A credal network under epistemic irrelevance is a generalised version of a Bayesian network that loosens its two main building blocks. On the one hand, the local probabilities do not have to be specified exactly. On the other hand, the assumptions of independence do not have to hold exactly.
De Bock, Jasper
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Epistemic irrelevance in credal networks : the case of imprecise Markov trees [PDF]
, 2009 We replace strong independence in credal networks with the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance. Focusing on directed trees, we show how to combine local credal sets into a global model, and we use this to construct and justify an exact message-passing algorithm that computes updated beliefs for a variable in the tree.
de Cooman, Gert +3 more
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Allowing for probability zero in credal networks under epistemic irrelevance [PDF]
, 2013 We generalise Cozman’s concept of a credal network under epistemic irrelevance (2000) to the case where lower (and upper) probabilities are allowed to be zero. Our main definition is expressed in terms of coherent lower previsions and imposes epistemic irrelevance by means of strong coherence rather than element-wise Bayes’s rule.
De Bock, Jasper, de Cooman, Gert
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Modelling epistemic irrelevance with choice functions
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 2020 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Van Camp, Arthur, Miranda, Enrique
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Understanding Fake News: Technology, Affects, and the Politics of the Untruth
Historia y Comunicación Social, 2019 This paper provides epistemic and conceptual tools for a better understanding of fake news. It begins by looking for a definition of fake news that distinguishes between fabricated news stories and biased claims, showing that fake news "stricto sensu" is
Manuel Arias Maldonado
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Presuppositions, provisos, and probability
Semantics and Pragmatics, 2012 Theories of presupposition in the tradition associated with Karttunen, Stalnaker and Heim relate presupposition satisfaction to the content of conversational participants’ epistemic states, usually modeled as sets of worlds.
Daniel Lassiter
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Epistemic irrelevance in credal nets: The case of imprecise Markov trees
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 2010 We focus on credal nets, which are graphical models that generalise Bayesian nets to imprecise probability. We replace the notion of strong independence commonly used in credal nets with the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance, which is arguably more suited for a behavioural theory of probability.
de Cooman, Gert +3 more
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How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting [PDF]
, 2017 Several philosophers have tried to develop a framework for decision-making in the face of fundamental moral uncertainty. Critics argue that the project is misguided, as it assumes that there’s a kind of “subjective” rightness that depends on which moral ...
Sepielli, Andrew
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