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Reasoning About Epistemic States of Agents by Modal Logic Programming [PDF]
, 2006 Modal logic programming is one of appropriate approaches to deal with reasoning about epistemic states of agents. We specify here the least model semantics, the fixpoint semantics, and an SLD-resolution calculus for modal logic programs in the multimodal logic KD4Ig5a, which is intended for reasoning about belief and common belief of agents.
Linh Anh Nguyen
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Modal Epistemic Logic on Contracts: A Doctrinal Approach
2019Problems related to the construction of consensus out of distributed knowledge have become actual again under a new perspective with the diffusion of distributed ledger techniques. In particular, when dealing with contracts, different observers must agree that a contract is in a certain state, even if not all transactions performed under the contract ...
Bottoni P. +3 more
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A general framework for modal correspondence in dynamic epistemic logic
, 2015 We introduce a unified framework for dynamic epistemic logics, which in particular encompasses Public Announcement Logic (PAL), Epistemic Action (EA) and Preference Upgrade (PU). Our framework consists of a generic language, in which some of the known reduction axioms are expressible, together with relational and algebraic semantics.
Shota Motoura
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Modal Epistemic and Doxastic Logic
2003Knowledge has always been a topic central to philosophy (cf. e.g. [Glymour, 1992]). Since ancient times philosophers have been interested in the way knowledge comes to us and in what way it relates to reality, the world in which we live. As is the case with so many things, during this century also the topic of knowledge has become the subject of formal
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An investigation of modal structures as an alternative semantic basis for epistemic logics
Computational Intelligence, 1989 In the past, Kripke structures have been used to specify the semantic theory of various modal logics. More recently, modal structures have been developed as an alternative to Kripke structures for providing the semantics of such logics. While these approaches are equivalent in a certain sense, it has been argued that modal structures provide a more ...
Sharon Joyce Hamilton +1 more
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On a Modal Epistemic Axiom Emerging from McDermott-Doyle Logics
Fundamenta Informaticae, 2009 An important question in modal nonmonotonic logics concerns the limits of propositional definability for logics of the McDermott-Doyle family. Inspired by this technical question we define a variant of autoepistemic logic which provably corresponds to the logic of the McDermott-Doyle family that is based on themodal axiom p5: ◊φ⊃ (¬□φ⊃□¬□φ).
Costas D. Koutras, Yorgos Zikos
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Epistemic Modality: The Problem of a Logical Theory of Belief Statements [PDF]
, 1968 This discussion is of an exploratory nature. It does not attempt the presentation of any accomplished theory of the logic of belief statements. Rather, its objectives are of a more limited scope. The present chapter merely attempts to examine some of the problems and difficulties that confront the construction of such a theory. Despite this limitation,
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Formal Analysis of Epistemic Modalities and Conditionals Based on Logic of Belief Structures
, 2015 There is a strong context dependency in meaning of modalities in natural languages. Kratzer [9] demonstrates how to deal with this problem within possible world semantics. In this paper, we propose to interpret epistemic modalities in background of an epistemic state.
Yasuo Nakayama
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Two incomplete anti-realist modal epistemic logics
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1990Many phrases have been used to express what are sometimes called anti-realist conceptions of truth: ‘verifiability’, ‘knowability’, ‘rational acceptability’, ‘warranted assertability’. In spite of their obvious differences, all four of these phrases have a common form; each is a cognitive attitude modified by ‘-ability’.
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On intuitionistic modal epistemic logic
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1992 openalex +2 more sources