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Epistemic injustice in psychiatric practice: epistemic duties and the phenomenological approach
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2021Epistemic injustice is a kind of injustice that arises when one’s capacity as an epistemic subject (eg, a knower, a reasoner) is wrongfully denied. In recent years it has been argued that psychiatric patients are often harmed in their capacity as knowers and suffer from various forms of epistemic injustice that they encounter in psychiatric services ...
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Epistemic constraints on practical normativity
Synthese, 2010What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not ...
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Epistemic Entitlements and the Practice of Computer Simulation
Minds and Machines, 2019What does it mean to trust the results of a computer simulation? This paper argues that trust in simulations should be grounded in empirical evidence, good engineering practice, and established theoretical principles. Without these constraints, computer simulation risks becoming little more than speculation.
John Symons, Ramón Alvarado
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Epistemic Tools and Artefacts in Epistemic Practices and Systems
2016This chapter extends Chap. 8 by following tools and other artefacts into their broader contexts of use. This helps understand how they function in professional work and learning in the larger systems of professional practice. An important feature of this chapter is that we draw upon the different but interwoven epistemic cultures of learning, research ...
Lina Markauskaite, Peter Goodyear
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Structural and Epistemic Parameters in Communities of Practice
Organization Science, 2005If communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991) are best understood as fluid social relations, enacted among a self-selected group of participants, then are they best left alone, free from “interference” by organizational managers and policymakers?
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Epistemic Practices of Engineering for Education
Science Education, 2017ABSTRACTEngineering offers new educational opportunities for students, yet also poses challenges about how to conceptualize the disciplinary core ideas, crosscutting concepts, and science and engineering practices of the disciplinary fields of engineering.
CHRISTINE M. CUNNINGHAM +1 more
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The nature of epistemic virtues in the practice of medicine
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2014There is an assumption in virtue epistemology that epistemic virtues are the same in different times and places. In this paper, however, I examine this assumption in the practice of medicine as a paradigm example. I identify two different paradigms of medical practice, one before and the other after the rise of bioethics in 1960s.
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Epistemic Gradualism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice: Responce to Hetherington
Philosophia, 2006This paper responds to Stephen Hetherington's discussion of my ‘Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?’ (2004). The Infallibilist skeptic holds that in order to know something, one must be able to rule out every possible alternative to the truth of one’s belief. This requirement is false.
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Epistemic Humility and Medical Practice: Translating Epistemic Categories into Ethical Obligations
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 2012Physicians and other medical practitioners make untold numbers of judgments about patient care on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. These judgments fall along a number of spectrums, from the mundane to the tragic, from the obvious to the challenging.
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Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement
Erkenntnis, 2013It is often thought that the correct metaphysics and epistemology of reasons will be broadly unified across different kinds of reason: reasons for belief, and reasons for action. This approach is sometimes thought to be undermined by the contrasting natures of belief and of action: whereas belief appears to have the ‘constitutive aim’ of truth (or ...
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