Results 301 to 310 of about 167,279 (356)
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The Epistemic vs. the Practical
2023Abstract This chapter defends a Dualism of Theoretical and Practical Reason: what we epistemically ought to believe and what we practically ought to believe may come apart, and both are independently authoritative. In particular, I argue that it’s not the case that epistemic reasons bear on what we ‘just plain ought’ to believe just to ...
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Epistemic Trust, Epistemic Responsibility, and Medical Practice
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 2008Epistemic trust is an unacknowledged feature of medical knowledge. Claims of medical knowledge made by physicians, patients, and others require epistemic trust. And yet, it would be foolish to define all epistemic trust as epistemically responsible.
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Epistemic injustice in psychiatric practice: epistemic duties and the phenomenological approach
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2021Epistemic injustice is a kind of injustice that arises when one’s capacity as an epistemic subject (eg, a knower, a reasoner) is wrongfully denied. In recent years it has been argued that psychiatric patients are often harmed in their capacity as knowers and suffer from various forms of epistemic injustice that they encounter in psychiatric services ...
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Epistemic Uniqueness and the Practical Relevance of Epistemic Practices
Philosophia, 2017By taking the practical relevance of coordinated epistemic standards into account, Dogramaci and Horowitz (Philosophical Issues, 26(1), 130–147, 2016) as well as Greco and Hedden (The Journal of Philosophy, 113(8), 365–395, 2016) offer a new perspective on epistemic permissiveness.
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Cross-cultural epistemic practices
Social Epistemology, 2002should provide a framework for the effective investigation of the entire complex problem of the intellectual processes of society—a study by which society as a whole seeks a perceptive relation to its total environment. It should lift the study of intellectual life from that of a scrutiny of the individual to an inquiry into the means by which a ...
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Invitational Rhetoric in Epistemic Practice
Rhetoric of Health & Medicine, 2021Over the last several decades there have been rapid advancements in treatment options available for infertility. Consequently, infertility has become a medicalized disease, which privileges a masculine epistemology. Problematically, this masculinist perception of infertility diminishes concern for the lived experiences of women living with infertility ...
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Hume’s practically epistemic conclusions?
Philosophical Studies, 2013The inoffensive title of Section 1.4.7 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ‘Conclusion of this Book’, belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume’s considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one.
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Epistemic Tools and Artefacts in Epistemic Practices and Systems
2016This chapter extends Chap. 8 by following tools and other artefacts into their broader contexts of use. This helps understand how they function in professional work and learning in the larger systems of professional practice. An important feature of this chapter is that we draw upon the different but interwoven epistemic cultures of learning, research ...
Lina Markauskaite, Peter Goodyear
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Epistemic Gradualism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice: Responce to Hetherington
Philosophia, 2006This paper responds to Stephen Hetherington's discussion of my ‘Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?’ (2004). The Infallibilist skeptic holds that in order to know something, one must be able to rule out every possible alternative to the truth of one’s belief. This requirement is false.
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Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality
Mind, 2022AbstractMany theories of rational action are predicated on the idea that what it is rational to do in a given situation depends, in part, on what it is rational to believe in that situation. In short: they treat epistemic rationality as explanatorily prior to practical rationality.
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