Results 271 to 280 of about 1,494,483 (312)
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Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
Journal of Economic Theory, 1991zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Fudenberg, Drew, Tirole, Jean
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The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986
The oft-encountered empirical regularity that the objective probability of winning exceeds the subjective one for favorites, with the reverse being true for long shots, is a natural consequence of requiring to hold in the betting market with risk-loving bettors. In fact, the empirical regularity is a necessary condition for equilibrium, although it may
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The oft-encountered empirical regularity that the objective probability of winning exceeds the subjective one for favorites, with the reverse being true for long shots, is a natural consequence of requiring to hold in the betting market with risk-loving bettors. In fact, the empirical regularity is a necessary condition for equilibrium, although it may
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International Journal of Game Theory, 2008
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Awareness and equilibrium [PDF]
Synthese, 2012 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Isolation by Distance in Equilibrium and Non-Equilibrium Populations
Evolution, 1993It is shown that for allele frequency data a useful measure of the extent of gene flow between a pair of populations is M∘=(1/FST-1)/4, which is the estimated level of gene flow in an island model at equilibrium. For DNA sequence data, the same formula can be used if FST is replaced by NST .
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Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2010
Summary: Consider a game whose strategies are ``contributions''. A strategy profile is a Kantian equilibrium if no player would like all players to alter their contributions by the same multiplicative factor. Kantian equilibria are Pareto efficient.
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Summary: Consider a game whose strategies are ``contributions''. A strategy profile is a Kantian equilibrium if no player would like all players to alter their contributions by the same multiplicative factor. Kantian equilibria are Pareto efficient.
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Knowledge at Equilibrium. [PDF]
, 1993 In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash equilibrium profile of strategies information is essentially symemetric when the same profile is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information. We show that,
MINELLI, Enrico, POLEMARCHAKIS H.
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Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints
2012The previous chapter presented mathematical programs for solving leaderfollower (Stackelberg) games when a single leader correctly anticipates the equilibrium reaction of followers, who in turn naively believe that the leader’s decisions are exogenous and fixed.
Steven A. Gabriel +4 more
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2004
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Equilibrium and non-equilibrium turbulent boundary layers
Progress in Aerospace Sciences, 2022Todd Lowe, William Devenport
exaly