Results 301 to 310 of about 672,774 (331)
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2018
AbstractThis chapter provides an overview of the structure, meaning and use of evidential markers in Modern Japanese and a brief summary of evidential markers through Japanese language history. Japanese has inferential evidentials and reportive markers.
Heiko Narrog, Wenjiang Yang
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AbstractThis chapter provides an overview of the structure, meaning and use of evidential markers in Modern Japanese and a brief summary of evidential markers through Japanese language history. Japanese has inferential evidentials and reportive markers.
Heiko Narrog, Wenjiang Yang
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Journal of Semantics, 2008
Linguistic expressions of modality and evidentiality have been the object of much active and exciting research for many years, but continue to pose challenges in all areas of semantic theory. Key aspects of their behaviour at the syntax–semantics interface, such as interactions with quantifiers and other operators or the calculation of modal ...
Takao Gunji +2 more
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Linguistic expressions of modality and evidentiality have been the object of much active and exciting research for many years, but continue to pose challenges in all areas of semantic theory. Key aspects of their behaviour at the syntax–semantics interface, such as interactions with quantifiers and other operators or the calculation of modal ...
Takao Gunji +2 more
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On the grammaticalization of evidentiality
Journal of Pragmatics, 2001This paper discusses the conditions for the grammaticalization of evidentiality in different languages, with special attention to the languages of South Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In these languages, evidentially marked discourse is opposed to neutral discourse, while in some other languages, evidential markers are necessarily included in ...
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Philosophical Studies, 2015
When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition.
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When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition.
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2018
AbstractThis chapter surveys three representative chunks of the Algonquian family: the Cree-Innu-Naskapi continuum, Ojibwe, and Eastern Algonquian. After noting the very productive role of lexical means of expressing perception (the closest Algonquian gets to sensory evidentials), it highlights how some of the Cree-Innu-Naskapi continuum languages show
Randolph Valentine +2 more
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AbstractThis chapter surveys three representative chunks of the Algonquian family: the Cree-Innu-Naskapi continuum, Ojibwe, and Eastern Algonquian. After noting the very productive role of lexical means of expressing perception (the closest Algonquian gets to sensory evidentials), it highlights how some of the Cree-Innu-Naskapi continuum languages show
Randolph Valentine +2 more
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Think, 2007
Should we always proportion belief to the available evidence? Scott Aikin believes so.
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Should we always proportion belief to the available evidence? Scott Aikin believes so.
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Philosophical Studies, 2019
Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but (to use a distinction from Pamela ...
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Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but (to use a distinction from Pamela ...
openaire +2 more sources