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2004
Abstract In some languages every statement must contain a specification of the type of evidence on which it is based: for example, whether the speaker saw it, or heard it, or inferred it from indirect evidence, or learnt it from someone else.
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Abstract In some languages every statement must contain a specification of the type of evidence on which it is based: for example, whether the speaker saw it, or heard it, or inferred it from indirect evidence, or learnt it from someone else.
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Non-Propositional Evidentiality
2018AbstractThis chapter deals with non-propositional evidentiality, i.e. evidential-like distinctions on markers whose scope is limited to a noun phrase. First, it presents the different types of non-propositional evidential markers, the most common of which are demonstrative pronouns and determiners.
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Evidential Extensions of Non-Evidential Categories
2004Abstract Mood, modality, tense, person, nominalizations, and complement clauses can develop overtones similar to some semantic features of evidentials. The conditional in French can be used for information obtained from a questionable secondhand source for whose veracity the speaker refuses to take responsibility. This does not mean that
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2011
AbstractTwo recent arguments purport to find a new and firmer foundation for evidentialism in the very nature of the concept of belief. Evidentialism is claimed to be a conceptual truth about belief, and pragmatism to be ruled out, conceptually. But can the conclusion of such conceptual arguments be regarded as the denial of pragmatism?
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AbstractTwo recent arguments purport to find a new and firmer foundation for evidentialism in the very nature of the concept of belief. Evidentialism is claimed to be a conceptual truth about belief, and pragmatism to be ruled out, conceptually. But can the conclusion of such conceptual arguments be regarded as the denial of pragmatism?
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Philosophical Studies, 2015
When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition.
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When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition.
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