Results 11 to 20 of about 3,044,939 (297)
Stochasticity and evolutionary stability [PDF]
In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be obtained in different limits. A particularly interesting example is evolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations, where strict Nash equilibria correspond to stable fixed points that are always evolutionarily stable.
Traulsen, A., Pacheco, J., Imhof, L.
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Exponential Stability of Evolutionary Equations [PDF]
AbstractIn this chapter we study the exponential stability of evolutionary equations. Roughly speaking, exponential stability of a well-posed evolutionary equation $$\displaystyle \left (\partial _{t,\nu }M(\partial _{t,\nu })+A\right )U=F $$ ∂
Christian Seifert +2 more
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Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games [PDF]
The authors consider an evolutionary selection game between two asymmetric players. Consequences of regularity and monotonic evolutions, in the case of strictly dominated strategies, are discussed. Conditions for the existence of replicator dynamic functions in a regular aggregate monotonic process are derived.
L. Samuelson, J. Zhang
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How Moral Codes Evolve in a Trust Game
This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect.
Jean Paul Rabanal, Daniel Friedman
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The Evolution of Ambiguity in Sender—Receiver Signaling Games
We study an extended version of a sender–receiver signaling game—a context-signaling (CS) game that involves external contextual cues that provide information about a sender’s private information state.
Roland Mühlenbernd +2 more
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An evolutionary model of European football was applied to analyze a two-stage indirect evolution game in which teams choose their utility function in the first stage, and their optimal talent investments in the second stage.
Aloys L. Prinz
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Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Multistage Games
Direct ESS has some disadvantages, which are seen even in the case of repeated games when the sequence of stage ESSs may not constitute the direct ESS in the repeated game.
Leon A. Petrosyan, Xiuxiu Liu
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On the Evolutionary Stability of Mendelian Segregation [PDF]
Abstract We present a model of a primary locus subject to viability selection and an unlinked locus that causes sex-specific modification of the segregation ratio at the primary locus. If there is a balanced polymorphism at the primary locus, a population undergoing Mendelian segregation can be invaded by modifier alleles that cause sex ...
Francisco, Ubeda, David, Haig
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Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players
This paper studies a repeated play of a family of games by resource-constrained players. To economize on reasoning resources, the family of games is partitioned into subsets of games which players do not distinguish.
Arina Nikandrova
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Rothmund-Thomson syndrome, a disorder far from solved
Rothmund-Thomson syndrome (RTS) is a rare autosomal recessive disorder characterized by a range of clinical symptoms, including poikiloderma, juvenile cataracts, short stature, sparse hair, eyebrows/eyelashes, nail dysplasia, and skeletal abnormalities ...
Davi Jardim Martins +5 more
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