Results 271 to 280 of about 3,044,939 (297)

Evolutionary stability in Lotka–Volterra systems

Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2003
The Lotka-Volterra model of population ecology, which assumes all individuals in each species behave identically, is combined with the behavioral evolution model of evolutionary game theory. In the resultant monomorphic situation, conditions for the stability of the resident Lotka-Volterra system, when perturbed by a mutant phenotype in each species ...
Cressman, Ross, J. Garay, József
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The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation

American Political Science Review, 1997
Is cooperation without central authority stable? If so, how robust is it? Despite what might be the conventional wisdom,The Evolution of Cooperationdid not solve this problem deductively. In fact, results obtained later by others seem to have contradicted the book's main message.
Jonathan Bendor, Piotr Swistak
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Evolutionary stability for large populations

Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2004
We present a revision of Maynard Smith's evolutionary stability criteria for populations which are very large (though technically finite) and of unknown size. We call this the large population ESS, as distinct from Maynard Smith's infinite population ESS and Schaffer's finite population ESS. Building on Schaffer's finite population model, we define the
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Stability in an evolutionary game

Theoretical Population Biology, 1984
Consider a population of plants or animals, ''players'' whose phenotype (or strategy) can be represented by a real number n. If only two strategies \(n_ 0\), \(n_ 1\) are in use, denote for \(i=0,1\) the fraction of players of type \(n_ i\) at time t by \(P_ i(t)\), and let the population evolve according to the law \[ (*)\quad P_ i(t+1)\sim P_ i(t ...
Vincent, Thomas L., Brown, Joel S.
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ON THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF "TOUGH" BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

International Game Theory Review, 2003
This paper investigates whether "tough" bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionarily stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game such behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus may be wasted. We also study the Ultimatum Game.
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Epictetusian rationality and evolutionary stability

Journal of Evolutionary Economics
An economic interpretation of Epictetus's precept of 'Taking away aversion from all things not in our power' consists of extending the do- main of indifference beyond its boundaries under non-ethical preferences, so as to yield indifference between outcomes differing only on things out- side one's control.
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Evolutionary and continuous stability

Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1983
Abstract A strategy in a population game is evolutionarily stable if, when adopted by large enough a majority in the population, it becomes advantageous against any mutant strategy. It is said to be continuously stable if, when the majority slightly deviates from it, some reduction of this deviation becomes individually advantageous.
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Weak selection and stochastic evolutionary stability in a stochastic replicator dynamics

Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2023
Yi Tao, Jiajia Wu, Xiudeng Zheng
exaly  

Evolutionary stability

1989
Immanuel M. Bomze, Benedikt M. Pötscher
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On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models

Journal of Economic Theory, 2002
Frank Riedel, Jörg Oechssler
exaly