Results 101 to 110 of about 184 (157)

A systematic review of empirical bioethics methodologies. [PDF]

open access: yesBMC Med Ethics, 2015
Davies R, Ives J, Dunn M.
europepmc   +1 more source
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A Pragmatic Logic for Expressivism

Theoria, 2020
AbstractThis article aims to show that the incompatibility between the application of logic to norms and values and the expressive conception of these notions – basically summed up by the Frege–Geach problem – can be overcome. To this end, a logic is constructed for the expressive conception of norms and values which provides a solution to the Frege ...
Dalla Pozza, Carlo   +3 more
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The essence of expressivism

Analysis, 1994
[1] Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) [2] Bob Hale, 'Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?' in Reality, Representation and Projection edited by J. Haldane and C. Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 337-63. [3] Frank Jackson, Review of Truth and Objectivity, Philosophical Books forthcoming.
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Revolutionary Expressivism

Ratio, 2013
AbstractWhile the meta‐ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become ...
Sebastian Köhler, Michael Ridge
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Expressivism

2018
Expressivism is a kind of noncognitivism, usually about morality. And noncognitivism is a metaethical theory, that is a theory about the subject matter of morality, about the nature of moral thought and about the meaning of moral language. Noncognitivist theories of ethics and morality contrast with cognitivist theories of ethics, according to which ...
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Expressivism

2007
AbstractMany philosophers think that internalism supports a non-cognitivist account of normative judgments, according to which these judgments do not count as genuine beliefs, but rather as non-cognitive states of some kind. Such non-cognitivist accounts of normative judgments naturally accompany an expressivist account of the meaning of normative ...
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