Results 141 to 150 of about 1,195 (187)
Expressivism, question substitution and evolutionary debunking [PDF]
Philosophical Psychology, 2017 Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on what Carter and Chrisman call “the core expressivist maneuver.” That is, instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value, we should be asking about the nature of the ...
Christos Kyriacou
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Analysis, 1994
[1] Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) [2] Bob Hale, 'Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?' in Reality, Representation and Projection edited by J. Haldane and C. Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 337-63. [3] Frank Jackson, Review of Truth and Objectivity, Philosophical Books forthcoming.
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[1] Simon Blackburn, Spreading The Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) [2] Bob Hale, 'Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?' in Reality, Representation and Projection edited by J. Haldane and C. Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 337-63. [3] Frank Jackson, Review of Truth and Objectivity, Philosophical Books forthcoming.
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Expressivism, inferentialism, and the status of attitudes [PDF]
Inquiry (United Kingdom)The aim of this paper is to show that expressivism about attitudes is not a tenable position. Although this claim has been often made in the literature, traditional arguments against attitudinal expressivism assumed a dated form of expressivism. In order
Krzysztof Poslajko
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2018
Expressivism is a kind of noncognitivism, usually about morality. And noncognitivism is a metaethical theory, that is a theory about the subject matter of morality, about the nature of moral thought and about the meaning of moral language. Noncognitivist theories of ethics and morality contrast with cognitivist theories of ethics, according to which ...
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Expressivism is a kind of noncognitivism, usually about morality. And noncognitivism is a metaethical theory, that is a theory about the subject matter of morality, about the nature of moral thought and about the meaning of moral language. Noncognitivist theories of ethics and morality contrast with cognitivist theories of ethics, according to which ...
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Ratio, 2013
AbstractWhile the meta‐ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become ...
Sebastian Köhler, Michael Ridge
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AbstractWhile the meta‐ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become ...
Sebastian Köhler, Michael Ridge
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2007
AbstractMany philosophers think that internalism supports a non-cognitivist account of normative judgments, according to which these judgments do not count as genuine beliefs, but rather as non-cognitive states of some kind. Such non-cognitivist accounts of normative judgments naturally accompany an expressivist account of the meaning of normative ...
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AbstractMany philosophers think that internalism supports a non-cognitivist account of normative judgments, according to which these judgments do not count as genuine beliefs, but rather as non-cognitive states of some kind. Such non-cognitivist accounts of normative judgments naturally accompany an expressivist account of the meaning of normative ...
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2014
Over the years, we have witnessed the rise of a metaethical cottage industry devoted to claiming that expressivist analyses cannot capture some allegedly important feature of moral language. In this paper, I show how Simon Blackburn's pragmatist method enables him to respond decisively to many of these objections.
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Over the years, we have witnessed the rise of a metaethical cottage industry devoted to claiming that expressivist analyses cannot capture some allegedly important feature of moral language. In this paper, I show how Simon Blackburn's pragmatist method enables him to respond decisively to many of these objections.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000
Expressivism faces four distinct problems when evaluative sentences are embedded in unassertive contexts like: (1) If lying is wrong, getting someone to lie is wrong, (2) Lying is wrong, so (3) Getting someone to lie is wrong. The initial problem is to show that expressivism is compatible with (1)-(3) being valid. The basic problem is for expressivists
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Expressivism faces four distinct problems when evaluative sentences are embedded in unassertive contexts like: (1) If lying is wrong, getting someone to lie is wrong, (2) Lying is wrong, so (3) Getting someone to lie is wrong. The initial problem is to show that expressivism is compatible with (1)-(3) being valid. The basic problem is for expressivists
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