Results 21 to 30 of about 2,812 (214)

Expressing What You Say: Neo‐Expressivism and the Matching Question [PDF]

open access: hybridTheoria, Volume 91, Issue 5, October 2025.
ABSTRACT It is often appropriate to defer to one another when we ascribe mental states to ourselves in the present tense, even when these self‐ascriptions are evidentially unsupported. One way to explain this ‘first‐person authority’ is in terms of what such self‐ascriptions express.
Benjamin Winokur
openalex   +2 more sources

The Frege-Geach Problem and the Logic of Higher-Order Attitudes [PDF]

open access: yesPizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī, 2023
Moral expressivism suggests that 1) moral sentences lack truth conditions and 2) our purpose in asserting moral sentences is to express non-cognitive attitudes such as desires, approval, or disapproval.
Bahram Alizade
doaj   +1 more source

The Motivation Problem of Epistemic Expressivists

open access: yesErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2023
Many philosophers have adopted epistemic expressivism in recent years. The core commitment of epistemic expressivism is that epistemic claims express conative states. This paper assesses the plausibility of this commitment.
Alexandre Duval, Charles Côté-Bouchard
doaj   +2 more sources

Social Rationality and Human Reasoning: Logical Expressivism and the Flat Mind [PDF]

open access: hybridTopics in Cognitive Science, Volume 17, Issue 3, Page 636-661, July 2025.
Abstract This paper attempts to reconcile the claims that the mind is both flat (Chater, 2018) and highly rational (Oaksford & Chater, 2020). According to the flat mind hypothesis, the mind is a mass of inconsistent and contradictory fragments of experience.
Mike Oaksford
openalex   +2 more sources

Representation, Deflationism, and the Question of Realism

open access: yesErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2021
How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their ...
Camil Golub
doaj   +2 more sources

Expressivism about delusion attribution

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2020
In this paper, I will present and advocate a view about what we are doing when we attribute delusion, namely, say that someone is delusional. It is an “expressivist” view, roughly analogous to expressivism in meta-ethics.
Sam Wilkinson
doaj   +1 more source

Moderate Epistemic Expressivism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2013
The present paper argues that there are at least two equally plausible yet mutually incompatible answers to the question of what is of non-instrumental epistemic value.
Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer
core   +4 more sources

Internalism and the frege: Geach problem [PDF]

open access: yesBelgrade Philosophical Annual, 2019
According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which moral ...
Strandberg Caj
doaj   +1 more source

Explaining disagreement: Contextualism, expressivism and disagreement in attitude [PDF]

open access: yesBelgrade Philosophical Annual, 2019
A well-known challenge for contextualists is to account for disagreement. Focusing on moral contextualism, this paper examines recent attempts to address this challenge by using the standard expressivist explanation, i.e., explaining disagreement in ...
Eriksson John
doaj   +1 more source

A Problem for Expressivism

open access: yesAnalysis, 1998
Abstract Language, Truth and Logic added expressivism to the inventory of substantive positions in meta-ethics, and the recent defences of versions of it by Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard have enhanced its status as a major position.1 Ayer presented the doctrine as an improvement on subjectivism-that is, on the doctrine that ethical ...
Jackson, Frank, Pettit, Philip
openaire   +1 more source

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