Results 21 to 30 of about 184 (157)

On Ernst Bloch’s Moral Theory

open access: yesPraktyka Teoretyczna, 2020
This article describes the origin of Bloch’s moral theory, which was formulated partly as a response to Simmel’s moral relativism. It also shows that Bloch’s theory is a coherent example of what Charles Taylor calls “expressivism,” a contemporary ...
Lucien Pelletier
doaj   +1 more source

A Match Made in (Rational) Heaven? How Credences Relate to Probability Beliefs

open access: yesTheoria, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Much has been said about the relation between credences and beliefs. Surprisingly little, however, has been said about how credences more specifically relate to probability beliefs. In this paper, I will argue that they are normatively related. This proposal goes against belief‐first reductionism, which says that credences just are probability
Roman Heil
wiley   +1 more source

UNWARRANTED CONFIDENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE POVERTY OF ANTI‐REALISM

open access: yesHistory and Theory, Volume 65, Issue 2, Page 271-297, June 2026.
ABSTRACT The Poverty of Anti‐Realism: Critical Perspectives on Postmodernist Philosophy of History, edited by Tor Egil Førland and Branko Mitrović, celebrates the new dawn of historical realism, which it claims supersedes the erroneous and harmful anti‐realism.
Jouni‐Matti Kuukkanen
wiley   +1 more source

The practicality of moral language and dynamic descriptivism

open access: yesMind &Language, Volume 41, Issue 1, Page 158-176, February 2026.
When speakers make moral claims, they often indicate that they are themselves committed to, or aim to commit their addressee to, certain actions or attitudes. The way that moral language is practical in these ways is often considered to be detrimental for any descriptivist semantics of moral language.
Stina Björkholm
wiley   +1 more source

Expressivism, self-knowledge, and rational agency

open access: yesHumanities & Social Sciences Communications, 2020
One family of thought about self-knowledge has argued that authoritative self-ascriptions express a form of higher-order knowledge whose special character is explained by the role that knowledge plays in rational agency.
Stephen Blackwood
doaj   +1 more source

Inferentialism as an Alternative to Expressivism

open access: yes, 2023
Abstract Normative discourse includes statements which appear to be truth-apt expressions of normative beliefs. But normative oughts do not seem to fit cleanly amongst the natural facts. This makes many naturalistically-inclined philosophers sympathetic to some form of the expressivist view that normative statements get their meaning ...
openaire   +2 more sources

Model‐Based Semantics: Doing Without Meaning Constitution

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 57, Issue 1-2, Page 103-118, January 2026.
Abstract This paper introduces a model‐based account of meaning, arguing that meaning properties reside in models rather than in the external world. Building on this view, it explores how such an instrumentalist framework can engage critically with various concerns raised by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Kripke[nstein]—each of whom voiced scepticism toward ...
Pietro Salis
wiley   +1 more source

An expressivist response to the infinite regress of interpretation argument against legal interpretivism

open access: yesRuch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny
The paper aims to address the Infinite Regress of Interpretation Argument against Legal Interpretivism by offering an expressivist defence. In this paper, Legal Interpretivism is understood as the view that determining the content of law requires ...
Michał Wieczorkowski
doaj   +1 more source

Ontological Expressivism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2021
Ontological expressivism is the view that ontological existence claims express noncognitive mental states. The chapter develops a version of ontological expressivism that is modeled after Gibbard’s (2003) norm-expressivism. It argues that, when speakers assess whether, say, composite objects exist, they rely on assumptions with regard to what is ...
openaire   +1 more source

Expressing What You Say: Neo‐Expressivism and the Matching Question

open access: yesTheoria, Volume 91, Issue 5, October 2025.
ABSTRACT It is often appropriate to defer to one another when we ascribe mental states to ourselves in the present tense, even when these self‐ascriptions are evidentially unsupported. One way to explain this ‘first‐person authority’ is in terms of what such self‐ascriptions express.
Benjamin Ian Winokur
wiley   +1 more source

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