Results 161 to 170 of about 92,664 (318)

Debt Ceilings With Fiscal Intransparency and Imperfect Electoral Accountability

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study optimal debt ceilings in a political‐agency model with uncertainty about both policymaker type (benevolent or selfish) and economic state (good or bad). Elections generate disciplining and selection effects that differ across pooling, hybrid, and separating equilibria induced by different ceilings.
Randolph Sloof   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Family Firms and Audit Effort: An Empirical Examination of Audit Hours per Auditor Rank

open access: yesInternational Journal of Auditing, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study examines how audit effort varies across auditor ranks in response to family firm ownership. Prior research suggests that family firms typically face lower information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, leading to reduced audit fees and effort.
Jagadison K. Aier   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Technocracy, Supranationalism and Right‐Wing Populism: The Variegated Sheltering of Western Assets in East Central European Countries

open access: yesJCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, EarlyView.
Abstract After the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, European Union (EU) governance has become more tolerant towards national policy adaptation and experimentation. Right‐wing populist governments in East Central Europe (ECE) have used this increased flexibility amongst other things to develop various economically nationalist strategies to reassert ...
Gerhard Schnyder   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

An Application of Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process in Risk Evaluation Model. [PDF]

open access: yesFront Psychol, 2021
Peng G   +5 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Do hostile takeovers reduce extramarginal wage payments? [PDF]

open access: yes
Hostile takeovers may have significant implications for long-term employment contracts if they facilitate the opportunistic expropriation of extramarginal wage payments.
David Neumark   +2 more
core  

Serial Investing and Strategic Commitment in Markets With Unknown Competitors

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study how serial investors who regularly face unknown competitors attempt to make their projects dominant. Innovating in new markets often involves uncertainty over the nature of the final product and who the key competitors will be. Such projects also have long‐term funding needs, so a commitment to provide the necessary funds imparts a ...
Naveen Khanna, Richmond Mathews
wiley   +1 more source

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