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Folk Psychology’ Is Not Folk Psychology
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2006This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or 'folk' psychology, whose 'core' involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges
Matthew Ratcliffe
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The Psychology of Folk Psychology
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1993AbstractFolk psychology, the naive understanding of mental state concepts, requires a model of how people ascribe mental states to themselves. Competent speakers associate a distinctive memory representation (a category representation, CR) with each mentalistic word in their lexicon.
Alvin Goldman
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Philosophical Studies, 1990
Abstract It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes.1 We say no. In section 1 we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires, and in part two we offer a diagnosis of what has ...
Philip Pettit, Frank Cameron Jackson
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Abstract It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes.1 We say no. In section 1 we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires, and in part two we offer a diagnosis of what has ...
Philip Pettit, Frank Cameron Jackson
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, 2007 This groundbreaking text examines contemporary ideas about folk psychology. It draws together disciplines that are as independent to one another as cognitive science and anthropology, whilst authors examine the consensual views of the subject.
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Cognition, 1994
Eliminativism has been a major focus of discussion in the philosophy of mind for the last two decades. According to eliminativists, beliefs and other intentional states are the posits of a folk theory of mind standardly called "folk psychology". That theory, they claim, is radically false and hence beliefs and other intentional states do not exist.
S, Stich, I, Ravenscroft
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Eliminativism has been a major focus of discussion in the philosophy of mind for the last two decades. According to eliminativists, beliefs and other intentional states are the posits of a folk theory of mind standardly called "folk psychology". That theory, they claim, is radically false and hence beliefs and other intentional states do not exist.
S, Stich, I, Ravenscroft
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Synthese, 2012
There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of action and the philosophy of science over folk psychological explanations of human action: do the (perhaps implicit) generalizations that underwrite such explanations purport to state contingent, empirically established connections between beliefs, desires, and actions, or do such generalizations ...
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There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of action and the philosophy of science over folk psychological explanations of human action: do the (perhaps implicit) generalizations that underwrite such explanations purport to state contingent, empirically established connections between beliefs, desires, and actions, or do such generalizations ...
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ELH, 2013
When James Macpherson turned to the popular poetry of ancient Scotland, he found in it what philosophers now call folk psychology: a commonsense theory about how minds work. Yet because his poems were largely forgeries, Macpherson winds up importing more recent physiology into his portrayal of ancient, pagan materialism.
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When James Macpherson turned to the popular poetry of ancient Scotland, he found in it what philosophers now call folk psychology: a commonsense theory about how minds work. Yet because his poems were largely forgeries, Macpherson winds up importing more recent physiology into his portrayal of ancient, pagan materialism.
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2006
The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is ...
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The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is ...
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2018
There is wide disagreement about the meaning of ordinary mental terms (such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘pain’). Sellars suggested that our use of these terms is governed by a widely shared theory, ‘folk psychology’, a suggestion that has gained empirical support in psychological studies of self-attribution and in a growing literature concerning how ...
Stephen P. Stich, Georges Rey
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There is wide disagreement about the meaning of ordinary mental terms (such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘pain’). Sellars suggested that our use of these terms is governed by a widely shared theory, ‘folk psychology’, a suggestion that has gained empirical support in psychological studies of self-attribution and in a growing literature concerning how ...
Stephen P. Stich, Georges Rey
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Folk psychology meets folk Darwinism
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2006The fact that beliefs in the supernatural are useful to people who hold them does not necessarily mean that these beliefs confer an evolutionary advantage to those who hold them. An evolutionary explanation for any biological phenomenon must meet rigorous criteria, but the facts in this case, even when taken at their face value, fall well short of ...
Jay Hegdé, Norman A. Johnson
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