Results 211 to 220 of about 336,297 (266)

Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses

The Heythrop Journal, 2013
This paper considers a problem that arises for free will defenses when considering the nature of God's own will. If God is perfectly good and performs praiseworthy actions, but is unable to do evil, then why must humans have the ability to do evil in order to perform such actions?
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A pragmatic defense of free will

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 1996
L'A. defend la these du compatibilisme pragmatique qui offre une justification pragmatique de notre croyance au libre-choix et a la responsabilite morale, en distinguant la necessite de la causalite deterministe de la necessite de l'implication des faits, fondee sur le critere pragmatique developpe par W ...
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Lafollette on Plantinga's free will defense

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 1983
Justification de Plantinga a l'egard d'une objection concernant la coexistence du mal et de Dieu.
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Transworld sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 1998
Il est reconnu par les philosophes que Dieu et le diable sont incompatibles. Cette idee est remise en question par Alvin Plantiga qui souligne la comptabilite de Dieu et du diable. L'A. souligne les failles de l'argumentation de Plantiga qui n'est pas convaincante.
Daniel Howard-Snyder, John O'Leary-Hawthorne   +1 more
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Natural evil and the Free Will Defense

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 1984
Recently Richard Swinburne has argued that the well-known Free Will Defense can provide an explanation of God's permitting moral evil (i.e., evil intentionally brought about by human agents) only if there is also natural evil (i.e., evil not intentionally brought about by human agents).1 Ultimately his argument aims to show that there must be natural ...
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Compatibilism, Evil, and the Free-Will Defense

Sophia, 2007
It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the ...
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The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense

Metaphysica, 2021
Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails.
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There Is No Free-Will Defense

2019
In this chapter, I focus on a Free-Will Defense that seeks to show that God is compatible with not just some evil, but with all the evil that exists in the world, and apply an ethics of significant freedom to this version of a Free-Will Defense.
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There is no Free-Will Defense

2017
This paper argues that there is no Free-Will Defense for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. It denies that God’s creating our world with the degree and amount of moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it could be defended in terms of the freedom that it provides, or has provided, to its members.
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In defense of free will: Neuroscience and criminal responsibility

International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 2019
Is neuroscience the death of free will and if so, does this mean the imminent demise of the psycho-legal practices related to insanity and criminal responsibility? For many scholars of neuro-jurisprudence, recent advances in brain sciences suggesting that the perception of free will is merely illusory, an epiphenomenon of unconscious brain activity, do
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