Results 51 to 60 of about 125,860 (118)

Markov Equilibria in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games [PDF]

, 2004
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) show that a simple homogeneous market with exogenous matching has continuum of (non-competitive) perfect equilibria, but the unique Markov perfect equilibrium is competitive.
Gale, Douglas, Sabourian, Hamid
core   +1 more source

Why Don’t You Let the Light In? Developing Radiant Patterns for a Critical Game Aiming Player Empowerment

Journal on Interactive Systems
The exponential growth of the digital games industry has intensified the use of Deceptive Patterns (DPs) – design strategies that, while profitable, undermine players’ psychological well-being by frustrating their needs for autonomy, competence, and ...
Luiz Santos Filho, Nayana Carneiro, Alairton Sousa Junior, Ticianne Darin   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests [PDF]

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages ...
Hirokazu Takizawa, Toshiji Kawagoe
core  

Selecting a pooling equilibrium in a signaling game with a bounded set of signals [PDF]

, 2019
In this paper, we study a general class of monotone signaling games, in which the support of the signal is limited or the cost of the signal is sufficiently low and as a result, there are multiple pooling equilibria.
Ropero García, Miguel Ángel
core  

A Note on Permutationally Convex Games [PDF]

In this paper we generalise marginal vectors and permutational convexity.We show that if a game is generalised permutationally convex, then the corresponding generalised marginal vector is a core element.Furthermore we refine the concept of permutational
Hamers, H.J.M., Norde, H.W., Velzen, S. van   +2 more
core   +1 more source

Balance of Power [PDF]

This paper argues that the efficiency distribution of players in a game determines how aggressively these players interact.We formalize the idea of balance of power: players fight very inefficient players but play softly versus equally (or more ...
Boone, J.
core   +1 more source

Deep Learning Based Energy, Spectrum, and SINR-Margin Tradeoff Enabled Resource Allocation Strategies for 6G

IEEE Access
In the rapidly evolving landscape of wireless communication systems, the forthcoming sixth-generation technology aims to achieve remarkable milestones, including ultra-high data rates and improved Spectrum Efficiency (SE), Energy Efficiency (EE), and ...
Vivek Pathak, R. Chethan, Rahul Jashvantbhai Pandya, Sridhar Iyer, Vimal Bhatia   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests [PDF]

This paper combines a literature overview of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics, with new models that fill some voids in the literature. We start with an overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver ...
Kris De Jaegher, Robert van Rooij
core  

Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core [PDF]

We consider information transmission in the core of an exchange economy with incomplete information by non-cooperative bargaining theory. Reformulating the coalitional voting game by Serrano and Vohra [Information transmission in coalitional voting games,
Okada, Akira
core  

Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics [PDF]

We characterize the smallest faces of the polyhedron of strategy profiles that could possibly be made asymptotically stable under some reasonable deterministic dynamics. These faces are Kalai and Samet's (1984) persistent retracts and are spanned by Basu
Christoph Kuzmics, Dieter Balkenborg, Josef Hofbauer   +2 more
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