Results 1 to 10 of about 201 (194)
Robust group strategy‐proofness
Strategy‐proofness (SP) is a sought‐after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy‐proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex post stage but not to the interim stage.
Kivinen, Steven, Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
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Functional Form of Nonmanipulable Social Choice Functions with Two Alternatives
We propose a new functional form characterization of binary nonmanipulable social choice functions on a universal domain and an arbitrary, possibly infinite, set of agents.
Anna De Simone, Ciro Tarantino
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Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation [PDF]
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated.
Awad, Edmond +4 more
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Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies [PDF]
Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity ...
Salvador Barberà +2 more
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On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model [PDF]
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. Therefore, in centralized markets like entry-level professional labor markets if the proposed matching is the workers-optimal stable ...
Ruth Martínez +3 more
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Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
SpanishMinistryof Economy ...
Berga, Dolors, Moreno, Bernardo
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Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
AbstractWe prove that group strategy‐proofness and strategy‐proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority‐based resource allocation problems with multi‐unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.
Romero Medina, Antonio, Triossi, Matteo
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Finding a fair and efficient multi-resource allocation is a fundamental goal in cloud computing systems. In this paper, we consider the problem of multi-resource allocation with a bounded number of tasks. We propose a lexicographic max–min maximin share (
Jie Li +3 more
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Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? [PDF]
A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these ...
Salvador Barberà +2 more
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Group obvious strategy-proofness
We introduce the concept of group obvious strategy-proofness, an extension of Li (2017)'s notion of obvious strategy-proofness, by requiring that truth-telling remains an obviously dominant strategy for any group of agents in the extensive game form implementing the social choice function.
Massó, Jordi|| +2 more
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