Results 181 to 190 of about 1,192 (212)

Use of Analog Signatures for Hardware Trojan Detection

Proceedings of the 14th FPGAworld Conference, 2017
Malicious Hardware Trojans can corrupt data which if undetected may cause serious harm. We propose a technique where characteristics of the data itself are used to detect Hardware Trojan (HT) attacks. In particular, we use a two-chip approach where we generate a data "signature" in analog and test for the signature in a partially reconfigurable digital
Taimour Wehbe, Vincent John Mooney, David C. Keezer, Omer T. Inan, Abdul Qadir Javaid   +4 more
openaire   +1 more source

Applied formal methods for hardware Trojan detection

2014 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), 2014
This paper addresses the potential danger using integrated circuits which contain malicious hardware modifications hidden in the silicon structure. A so called hardware Trojan may be added at several stages of the chip development process. This work concentrates on formal hardware Trojan detection during the design phase and highlights applied ...
Michael Rathmair, Florian Schupfer, Christian Krieg   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

Hardware Trojan Insertion and Detection in Asynchronous Circuits

2019 25th IEEE International Symposium on Asynchronous Circuits and Systems (ASYNC), 2019
Hardware Trojan threats caused by malicious designers and untrusted manufacturers have become one of serious issues in modern VLSI systems. In this paper, we show some experimental results to insert hardware Trojans into asynchronous circuits. As a result, the overhead of hardware Trojan insertion in asynchronous circuits may be small for malicious ...
Koutaro Inaba, Tomohiro Yoneda, Toshiki Kanamoto, Atsushi Kurokawa, Masashi Imai   +4 more
openaire   +1 more source

On-demand transparency for improving hardware Trojan detectability

2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008
Malevolent Trojan circuits inserted by layout modifications in an IC at untrustworthy fabrication facilities are difficult to detect by traditional post-manufacturing testing. In this paper, we develop a novel low-overhead design methodology that facilitates the detection of inserted Trojan hardware in an IC through logic testing.
Rajat Subhra Chakraborty, Somnath Paul, Swarup Bhunia   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

Random Forest Classifier For Hardware Trojan Detection

2019 12th International Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Design (ISCID), 2019
Hardware Trojans, which exist in the integrated circuits in the form of additional logic units, will affect the supply voltage of nearby units. In this paper, the ring oscillator is introduced to diagnose the state of the chip for its high sensitivity to the fluctuation of supply voltage.
Yiyao Xiang, Lei Li, Wanting Zhou
openaire   +1 more source

EM-based detection of hardware trojans on FPGAs

2014 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2014
The detectability of malicious circuitry on FPGAs with varying placement properties yet has to be investigated. The authors utilize a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro target platform in order to insert a sequential denial-of-service Trojan into an existing AES design by manipulating a Xilinx-specific, intermediate file format prior to the bitstream generation ...
Oliver Soll, Thomas Korak, Michael Muehlberghuber, Michael Hutter   +3 more
openaire   +1 more source

Overview of hardware trojan detection and prevention methods

2015 European Conference on Circuit Theory and Design (ECCTD), 2015
Hardware Trojans (HTs) are identified as an emerging threat for the integrity of Integrated Circuits (ICs) and their applications. Attackers attempt to maliciously manipulate the functionality of ICs by inserting HTs, potentially causing disastrous effects (Denial of Service, sensitive information leakage, etc.). Over the last 10 years, various methods
Julien Francq, Florian Frick
openaire   +1 more source

Hardware Trojans: Threats, Detection, and Prevention

Proceedings of the 2023 3rd International Conference on Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and Risk Management, 2023
Chaoen Xiao, Xiangze Chang, Jianxin Wang, Lei Zhang 0217, Hongke Xu, Xinwei Wu 0005, Yuzheng Zheng   +6 more
openaire   +1 more source

Hardware Trojan Detection

2023
Mark Tehranipoor, N. Nalla Anandakumar, Farimah Farahmandi   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

Detecting hardware trojans: a tale of two techniques

2015 Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design (FMCAD), 2015
Integrated Circuits (ICs) are designed and fabricated in a globalized multi-vendor environment making them vulnerable to malicious design changes and the insertion of hardware Trojans/malware. In this talk I will cover two distinct techniques to address the problem of detecting hardware Trojans.
openaire   +1 more source