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Belief beyond reason: a radical relativist hinge epistemology. [PDF]

open access: yesAsian J Philos
Abstract Hinge epistemology is sometimes thought to have controversial relativist and non-evidentialist commitments. This paper develops and motivates an explicitly relativist and radically non-evidentialist version of hinge epistemology, following and combining aspects of Ashton’s (2019) defense of relativist hinge epistemology and Pritchard’
Johnson D.
europepmc   +5 more sources

Contrastive Hinge Epistemology [PDF]

open access: yesTheoria, 2021
AbstractIn this paper, I outline an account of the structure of perceptual justification that develops Wittgenstein's thought that the possibility of acquiring any degree of justification for our beliefs depends on placing certain propositions outside the route of empirical inquiry, turning them into the “hinges” of our rational evaluations.
Giorgio Volpe
openaire   +4 more sources

From distance to embodiment—objectivity and empathy in Swedish rape trials [PDF]

open access: yesFrontiers in Sociology
This article investigates how objectivity is performed and embodied in Swedish rape trials, where legal decisions often hinge on oral testimonies rather than technical evidence.
Moa Bladini
doaj   +2 more sources

Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology [PDF]

open access: yesSynthese, 2019
Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments.
Jope, Matt
core   +5 more sources

Skepticism unhinged [PDF]

open access: yesBelgrade Philosophical Annual, 2020
The paper explores the anti-skeptical bearing of the kind of hinge epistemology I have developed in Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put ...
Coliva Annalisa
doaj   +1 more source

Reasons, Emotions, and Evidentialism: Reflections on William Wainwright’s Reason and the Heart [PDF]

open access: yesPizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī, 2022
In Reason and the Heart, William Wainwright defends a kind of religious evidentialism, one that takes int consideration the promptings of the heart, provided the heart is a virtuous one; and he claims that this view is able to avoid relativism.
Muhammad Legenhausen
doaj   +1 more source

Sosa, general assumptions, and the skeptical trojan horse

open access: yesTrans/Form/Ação, 2022
For many hinge epistemologists, general, background assumptions are principles that help providing default or presumptive justification to our empirical beliefs.
Modesto Gómez-Alonso
doaj   +1 more source

Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
What role does ‘ordinary language philosophy’ play in the defense of common sense beliefs? J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein each give central place to ordinary language in their responses to skeptical challenges to common sense beliefs. But Austin and
Lawlor, Krista
core   +1 more source

A Critical Realist Critique of “Measurement in Quantitative Educational Research: An Instrumental Mistake?” by Sigve Høgheim

open access: yesNordisk tidsskrift for pedagogikk og kritikk, 2023
Both Sigve Høgheim and I advance a similar critique of representationalism, operationalism and construct validity as found in psychology. Our respective critiques hinge on the way that these concepts do not adequately consider the ontological question ...
Leigh Price
doaj   +1 more source

Anscombe’s Moral Epistemology and the Relevance of Wittgenstein’s Anti-Scepticism

open access: yesEnrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofia, 2020
Elizabeth Anscombe is well-known for her insistence that there are absolutely prohibited actions, though she is somewhat obscure about why this is so. Nonetheless, I contend in this paper that Anscombe is more concerned with the epistemology of absolute ...
Michael Wee
doaj   +1 more source

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