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Why God Cannot Do What Sterba Wants
Sterba argues that if God existed, God would allow lower-level evils and suffering but should and would prevent all significant and horrendous evils. Since such serious evils do exist, God does not exist. In reply, I argue that in creating a Sterba world,
Stephen T. Davis
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A Compensatory Response to the Problem of Evil: Revisited
In this essay, I revisit the univocity thesis, Sterba’s analogy between God and a leader of a politically liberal society, and, most fundamentally, whether the existence of horrendous evils is logically compatible with the existence of a good God.
Michael Douglas Beaty
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Brief Remarks on Sterba’s Moral Argument from Evil
We pose two challenges to Sterba’s position. First, we show that Sterba fails to consider alternative historical positions such as Leibniz’s (who argues that God knows that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds) or Kant’s (who suggests that
Marco Hausmann, Amit Kravitz
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This paper provides an analysis of James Sterba’s argument from evil in the world and the author’s Thomistic counterargument. Many authors of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion discuss the concept of “horrendous evils”, which is a ...
Patrik Hrmo
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Can Heaven Justify Horrendous Moral Evils? A Postmortem Autopsy
James Sterba has recently constructed a new and compelling logical problem of evil that rejects Plantinga’s free-will defense and employs the concept of significant freedom and the Pauline Principle to demonstrate an incompatibility between the existence
Asha Lancaster-Thomas
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On James Sterba’s Refutation of Theistic Arguments to Justify Suffering
In his recent book Is a Good God Logically Possible? and article by the same name, James Sterba argued that the existence of significant and horrendous evils, both moral and natural, is incompatible with the existence of God.
Bruce R. Reichenbach
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Evil and Divine Power: A Response to James Sterba’s Argument from Evil
In this article, I offer a response to James P. Sterba’s moral argument for the non-existence of God. Sterba applies to God the so-called Pauline Principle that it is not permissible to do evil in order that good may come.
Elizabeth Burns
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In Answer to the Pauline Principle: Consent, Logical Constraints, and Free Will
James Sterba uses the Pauline Principle to argue that the occurrence of significant, horrendous evils is logically incompatible with the existence of a good God.
Marilie Coetsee
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Heaven and the Goodness of God
In this essay, I argue that we should take fully seriously the doctrine of heaven when dealing with the problem of evil in our world. The hope of heaven is integral to Christian theism so it cannot be neglected in any substantive discussion of the ...
Jerry L. Walls
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A Compensatory Response to the Problem of Evil
In this essay, I affirm the univocity thesis while discussing some alternative positions that avoid the problem of evil by rejecting the univocity thesis.
Michael Douglas Beaty
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