Results 171 to 180 of about 13,851 (213)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.

Related searches:

Is Akrasia Necessary for Culpability? On Douglas Husak’s Ignorance of Law

Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2017
This paper discusses Douglas Husak’s view that ignorance of the law always reduces culpability since the only fully culpable agents are those who are akratic—who act, that is, in a way that they judge to be wrongful, all things considered. The paper argues that this position is in tension with Husak’s avowed commitment to a reasons-responsiveness ...
G. Yaffe
openaire   +2 more sources

More Attempts: A Reply to Duff, Husak, Mele and Walen

Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2012
In this paper, I reply to the very thoughtful comments on my book by Antony Duff, Doug Husak, Al Mele and Alec Walen.
G. Yaffe
openaire   +2 more sources

Justifying Punishment: A Response to Douglas Husak

Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2008
In 'Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content?', Douglas Husak argues that an analysis of the justifiability of the criminal law depends upon an analysis of the justifiability of state punishment. According to Husak, an adequate justification of state punishment both must show why the state is permitted to infringe valuable rights such as the right not ...
K. Brownlee
openaire   +3 more sources

IS the Criminal Law (so) Special? Comments on Douglas Husak's Theory of Criminalization

Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, 2010
This is Re'em Segev's contribution to the symposium on Douglas Husak's book "Overcriminalization."
Re’em Segev
openaire   +2 more sources

Is Justification (Somehow) Prior to Excuse? A Reply to Douglas Husak

Law and Philosophy, 2005
In his "On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse," Professor Husak investigates and contests the claim that justification is prior to excuse. In what way, if any, is it prior? I'm not sure that I think it is. At least, I doubt that there is a law-like generalization to be made here.
M. Baron
openaire   +2 more sources

Comments on Doug Husak: The Low Cost of Recognizing (and of Ignoring) the Limited Relevance of Intentions to Permissibility

Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2008
Doug Husak frames a worry that makes sense in the abstract, but in reality, there is not much to worry about. The thesis that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility (IIP) is a straw man. There are reasons to think that the moral significance of intentions is not properly registered in criminal law.
A. Walen
openaire   +2 more sources

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy