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Getting to implementation: Adaptation of an implementation playbook [PDF]
Frontiers in Public Health, 2023 IntroductionImplementation strategies supporting the translation of evidence into practice need to be tailored and adapted for maximum effectiveness, yet the field of adapting implementation strategies remains nascent. We aimed to adapt “Getting To Outcomes”® (GTO), a 10-step implementation playbook designed to help community-based organizations plan ...
Vera Yakovchenko +16 more
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Implementation with a sympathizer
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023 We study Nash implementation under complete information with the distinctive feature that the planner knows neither individuals’ state-contingent preferences (payoff states) nor how they correspond to the states of the economy on which the social goal depends.
Ozan Altuğ Altun +2 more
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Implementation with evidence [PDF]
Theoretical Economics, 2012 We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic
Kartik, Navin, Tercieux, Olivier
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Rationalizable Implementation [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010 We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive, i.e.
Bergemann, Dirk +2 more
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Review of Economic Design, 2022 Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite environments.
Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran
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The Implementation Duality [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015 We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality.
Larry Samuelson +2 more
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Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2003 This paper discusses an interested party who wishes to influence the behavior of agents in a game (multi-agent interaction), which is not under his control. The interested party cannot design a new game, cannot enforce agents' behavior, cannot enforce payments by the agents, and cannot prohibit strategies available to the agents.
Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanism whose equilibrium outcomes are optimal according to some social choice rule. However, the cleverness of these mechanisms relies on intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path.
Luis Corchón +2 more
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Continuous Implementation [PDF]
Econometrica, 2012 In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a social choice function is continuously implementable. More specifically, we say that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable if it is (partially) implementable for types in the model under study and it continues to be (partially ...
Oury, Marion, Tercieux, Olivier
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