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By incentive reversal we refer to situations in which an increase in rewards for all agents results in fewer agents exerting effort. We show that externalities among peers may give rise to such intriguing situations even when all agents are fully rational.
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We introduce a concept of emotions that emerge when workers compare their own performance with a given standard or with the performances of co-workers. Assuming heterogeneity among the workers the interplay of emotions and incentives is analyzed by focusing on three incentive schemes that are frequently used in practice: tournaments, bonuses and piece ...
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Incentives and Discrimination [PDF]
Optimal incentive mechanisms may require that agents are rewarded differentially even when they are completely identical and are induced to act the same. We demonstrate this point by means of a simple incentive model where agents’ decisions about effort exertion is mapped into a probability that the project will succeed.
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Journal of Health Communication, 2011
This article discusses incentives to help make healthy choices the easy choices for individuals, operating at the levels of the individual, producers and service providers, and governments. Whereas paying individuals directly to be healthier seems to have a limited effect, offering financial incentives through health insurance improves health. Changing
Oliver Harrison+3 more
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This article discusses incentives to help make healthy choices the easy choices for individuals, operating at the levels of the individual, producers and service providers, and governments. Whereas paying individuals directly to be healthier seems to have a limited effect, offering financial incentives through health insurance improves health. Changing
Oliver Harrison+3 more
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This paper characterizes the structure of monetary incentives in an organization with varying differences in employee status. With the help of a moral hazard framework with limited liability we show that for agents with lower outside option increased status leads to lower incentive pay whereas exactly the opposite happens for agents with higher outside
Dey, Oindrila, Banerjee, Swapnendu
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Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves these problems by developing a variety of institutions. This paper describes and assesses the various forms of incentive contracts.
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Third Latin American Web Congress (LA-WEB'2005), 2005
We consider a setting in which users seeking information or services can pose queries, together with incentives for answering them, that are propagated along paths in a network. This type of information-seeking process can be formulated as a game among the nodes in the network, and this game has a natural Nash equilibrium.
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We consider a setting in which users seeking information or services can pose queries, together with incentives for answering them, that are propagated along paths in a network. This type of information-seeking process can be formulated as a game among the nodes in the network, and this game has a natural Nash equilibrium.
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We model organization as the command-and-communication network of managers erected on top of technology (which is modeled as a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to deal with shocks that affect the plants that he oversees directly or indirectly.
Eric Maskin, Yingyi Qian, Cheng-Gang Xu
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