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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2013
The consequence argument attempts to show that incompatibilism is true by showing that if there is determinism, then we never had, have or will have any choice about anything. Much of the debate on the consequence argument has focused on the “beta” transfer principle, and its improvements.
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The consequence argument attempts to show that incompatibilism is true by showing that if there is determinism, then we never had, have or will have any choice about anything. Much of the debate on the consequence argument has focused on the “beta” transfer principle, and its improvements.
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2003
AbstractA basic characterization of free will is offered, and common beliefs about the value of free will are reviewed. Two incompatibilist theses are distinguished: broad incompatibilism holds that both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, while merely narrow incompatibilism holds that free will requires indeterminism ...
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AbstractA basic characterization of free will is offered, and common beliefs about the value of free will are reviewed. Two incompatibilist theses are distinguished: broad incompatibilism holds that both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, while merely narrow incompatibilism holds that free will requires indeterminism ...
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Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2010Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2002
1. According to R. J. Wallace in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, when we ask whether X is morally responsible for some bad act A, we are asking whether X is blameworthy for A. And when we ask whether X is blameworthy for doing A, we are asking whether it would be morally fair to blame him for it.
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1. According to R. J. Wallace in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, when we ask whether X is morally responsible for some bad act A, we are asking whether X is blameworthy for A. And when we ask whether X is blameworthy for doing A, we are asking whether it would be morally fair to blame him for it.
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How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism
Erkenntnis, 2004zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism
Philosophia, 2016Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the “rollback argument”. In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises.
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Hard incompatibilism and its rivals
Philosophical Studies, 2009In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate.
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