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Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs [PDF]
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Anderlini L., Felli L.
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INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING
Metroeconomica, 2008ABSTRACTContractual incompleteness has been understood in the literature as the conditions under which contracts are insufficiently state contingent due to non‐observable and/or non‐verifiable states of the world. The term incomplete contracts has been used in different meanings: to denote both proper contractual incompleteness (in a complete contracts
Basile, Liliana, Trani, Raffaele
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Incomplete contracts versus communication
Journal of Economic Theory, 2022zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Andreas Blume, Inga Deimen, Sean Inoue
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An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting
The Review of Economic Studies, 1992We analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor. Both agents have potentially conflicting objectives since the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project while the investor is only concerned about monetary returns.
Aghion, Philippe, Bolton, Patrick
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On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts [PDF]
Abstract I examine the theoretical foundations underlying the incomplete contracts literature. A common justification for the assumption that contracts are not fully contingent on the state of nature is to point out that some aspects of the state may be unforeseen or indescribable to the contracting partners at the time the contract is written.
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Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
Review of Economic Studies, 1999zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Maskin, Eric, Tirole, Jean
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2002
Parties to lending agreements can create priority rankings in two ways: by securing a lender or by protecting the lender's debt with financial covenants. Protected debt turns into high priority debt because the early lender will permit covenant violations only if a later lender agrees to subordinate its claim. The Bankruptcy Code sustains both forms of
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Parties to lending agreements can create priority rankings in two ways: by securing a lender or by protecting the lender's debt with financial covenants. Protected debt turns into high priority debt because the early lender will permit covenant violations only if a later lender agrees to subordinate its claim. The Bankruptcy Code sustains both forms of
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2018
Chapter 36 considers issues that result from the incompleteness of a contract. In economic theory a complete contract is a contract that specifies the parties’ rights, duties, and remedies under every possible state of the world. Under this conception every contract is incomplete, because it would be prohibitively expensive to delineate the effect of ...
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Chapter 36 considers issues that result from the incompleteness of a contract. In economic theory a complete contract is a contract that specifies the parties’ rights, duties, and remedies under every possible state of the world. Under this conception every contract is incomplete, because it would be prohibitively expensive to delineate the effect of ...
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Incomplete Contracting in Strategic Alliances
2014Abstract Though incomplete contracts have generally been viewed as inefficient governance mechanisms in strategic alliances, recent contributions suggest that incomplete contracts are conducive to innovation. By integrating transaction cost economics (TCE) and agency theory (AT) we shed light on this contradiction by stating what ...
Sumo, Regien +3 more
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