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Relevant Irrelevance: The Relevance of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Family Bargaining
2015Introducing production to a family bargaining model immediately sets the stage for the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA). Requiring that bargaining solutions satisfy IIA rules out the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, but the broad class of Generalized Utilitarian bargaining solutions satisfies this axiom.
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Choosing and Describing: Sen and the Irrelevance of Independence Alternatives
Theory and Decision, 2007Amartya Sen argues that it is not, after all, irrational to reverse preferences when your choices are amplified by an ‘irrelevant’ alternative. He offers examples such as the agent who always picks the next-to-largest piece of cake. Given a choice between a larger and smaller piece, I will prefer the smaller one.
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Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives under the Lens of Pairwise Distortion
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial IntelligenceWe give a quantitative analysis of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. IIA says that the society's preference between x and y should depend only on individual preferences between x and y: we show that, in several contexts, if the individuals express their preferences about additional (``irrelevant'') alternatives, this information ...
Théo Delemazure +2 more
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Independence of irrelevant alternatives and revealed preferences
1992Chapter 2 dealt with the Nash bargaining solution and its nonsymmetric extensions. The first characterization of the Nash bargaining solution, by Nash (1950), was based on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. This chapter is a further exploration into the consequences of this axiom.
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A Note on A. D. Taylor’s Property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives for Voting Rules
Studies in Microeconomics, 2017In a widely used textbook on mathematics and politics, Taylor introduced an interesting property of social choice procedures, which we call ‘Taylor’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (TIIA)’. Taylor proved a result showing that every voting procedure belonging to a certain class of voting procedures violates TIIA. The purpose of this note is to
Somdeb Lahiri, Prasanta K. Pattanaik
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Social Choice and Welfare, 2006
Consider a social welfare function à la Arrow (the social preference is a complete preorder). If this function satisfies the Pareto principle, non-dictatorship and universality (no restrictions on individual complete preorders), some weak form of independence disallows both anonymity and neutrality.
Campbell, Donald E., Kelly, Jerry S.
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Consider a social welfare function à la Arrow (the social preference is a complete preorder). If this function satisfies the Pareto principle, non-dictatorship and universality (no restrictions on individual complete preorders), some weak form of independence disallows both anonymity and neutrality.
Campbell, Donald E., Kelly, Jerry S.
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Social Choice and Welfare, 2014
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017
In this paper we present some results for preference aggregation functionals defined on rich admissible sets. Our results are concerned with an Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption due to Alan D. Taylor suitably adjusted to be applicable in the framework of preference aggregation functionals.
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In this paper we present some results for preference aggregation functionals defined on rich admissible sets. Our results are concerned with an Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption due to Alan D. Taylor suitably adjusted to be applicable in the framework of preference aggregation functionals.
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On Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Dynamic Programming in Dynamic Bargaining Games
1995We consider bargaining games where the players control a dynamic system and the feasible set consists of utility gains over multiple time periods. It is assumed that the players can make binding contracts over the time horizon in question and that they are allowed to monitor the contract as the game evolves.
Harri Ehtamo, Jukka Ruusunen
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A Monte Carlo Study of Tests for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Property
1993A plethora of tests for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IA) property of Logit models of discrete choice behavior has been proposed in the literature. These tests are based upon asymptotic arguments and little is known about their size and power properties in finite samples.
Fry, Tim R. L. +3 more
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