Results 241 to 250 of about 249,913 (283)

Auditing of Danish pig herds for controlled housing requirements and Trichinella. [PDF]

Food Waterborne Parasitol
Alban L, Enemark H, Petersen HH, Nielsen LH.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Tecovirimat-Related Substance: Characterization, Hirshfeld Analysis, Theoretical Study, In Silico Toxicity Assessment. [PDF]

Molecules
Wang F, Hu X, Zhang C, Luan L, Zhou Z, Liu Y.   +5 more
europepmc   +1 more source

‘Why Would You Want to Do That?’ A Tribute to the ‘Exquisite Obsession’ and Legacy of Professor Dame June Clark, Health Visitor, 1931–2025

Journal of Advanced Nursing, EarlyView.
Daniel Kelly, Sarah Cowley, Michelle Moseley, Debra Jackson   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Unveiling quality of clinical trial in China: from concern to confirmation. [PDF]

Cancer Commun (Lond)
Huang H, Hou Y, Fang H, Xu L, Yu Y, Zhang H, Zhang J, Tang Y, Lan G, Zhang W, Li N.   +10 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.

Related searches:

The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2002
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Laurent Franckx
exaly   +3 more sources

Inspection focus announced

Early Years Educator, 2009
The Care Commission has announced that its Inspection Focus area for 2009-2010 will focus on the need for involving parents and carers in the development and learning needs of their children.
exaly   +2 more sources

Which Inspection Approach Is Better to Prevent Drug Fraud: Announced or Unannounced?

Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 2018
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Manman Zhang, JulianG Zhang, T C E Cheng   +2 more
exaly   +2 more sources

Announced vs. surprise inspections with tipping-off

European Journal of Political Economy, 2014
Abstract This paper analyzes a model in which a firm's compliance with regulation is monitored by a supervisor. The supervisor exerts costly, unobservable effort to raise his inspection intensity, which leads to moral hazard. A non-compliant firm may exert effort in avoidance to reduce the probability of sanction.
Emmanuel Dechenaux
exaly   +2 more sources