Results 221 to 230 of about 77,065 (262)
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The direct marketing of insurance

European Journal of Operational Research, 1998
An insurance company, like many in the financial services industry, will advertise a product in the press and some readers will avail themselves of it. Often the cost of an advertisement will exceed the income derived from the accepted respondents in the following years. It only becomes profitable if acquiring names into a database results in purchases
Keet Peng Onn, Alan Mercer
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Experimental markets for insurance

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1989
This article extends the large amount of research on double-oral auction markets to hazards that produce only losses. We report results from a series of experiments in which subjects endowed with low-probability losses can pay a premium for insurance protection.
Camerer, Colin, Kunreuther, Howard
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Market Power in Health Insurance, Effects on Insurance and Medical Markets

The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1979
THE private health insurance industry is large and important. As discussed by Karen Davis [2], it figures prominently in several plans for national health insurance. However, very little is known about the degree of competition in that industry or the effect that competition has on insurance and medical markets.
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Insurance contracts and financial markets

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Andrés Carvajal, João Thereze
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Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection

Journal of Political Economy, 1972
The article develops a theory of demand for insurance that emphasizes the interaction between market insurance, “self-insurance,” and “self-protection.” The effects of changes in “prices,” income, and other variables on the demand for these alternative forms of insurance are alalyzed using the “state preference” approach to behavior under uncertainty ...
Ehrlich, Isaac, Becker, Gary S
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Insurer ambiguity and market failure

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1993
A series of studies investigate the decision processes of actuaries, underwriters, and reinsurers in setting premiums for ambiguous and uncertain risks. Survey data on prices reveal that all three types of these insurance decision makers are risk averse and ambiguity averse. In addition, groups appear to be influenced in their premium-setting decisions
Howard Kunreuther   +2 more
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The Insurance Market

1997
During the eighteenth century, insurance was regarded as a form of gambling. In Britain, wagers on birth, marriage and death was controlled by the Gambling Act of 1774 and the Annuity Act of 1777. Also, it was not clearly understood that different forms of insurance have different special features and that the nature of their markets also vary ...
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LEARNING AND EVIDENCE IN INSURANCE MARKETS

International Economic Review, 2023
AbstractI analyze a model of monopoly insurance contracting where the consumer has access to endogenous, costly evidence of his risk type. I characterize when the consumer is worse off if the insurer is allowed to condition contracts on evidence and when the ability to contract on evidence leads to a Pareto improvement.
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Justice and the Market for Health Insurance

Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 1991
After reviewing some of the insurance-related obstacles to access to health care, some ethical criteria for evaluating proposals aimed at reforming the health insurance marketplace to achieve universal access are developed. The additional reforms needed to eliminate many of the deficiencies in the current health insurance marketplace are discussed.
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Deposit insurance and market discipline

Journal of Financial Stability, 2019
Limited coverage is a standard feature in deposit insurance schemes. It is used to limit moral hazard, and achieves this objective by reinforcing market discipline: depositors have more incentives to monitor banks’ risk-taking if they have skin in the game.
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