Results 221 to 230 of about 12,776 (262)
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Synthese, 1999
Dans le cadre du debat scientifique sur la conception physicaliste des qualias, l'A. defend la these intentionnaliste de l'apparence phenomenale des couleurs, en particulier, et des caracteristiques qualitatives de l'experience perceptive, en general. Rejetant la forme intentionnaliste de l'internalisme des qualias, l'A.
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Dans le cadre du debat scientifique sur la conception physicaliste des qualias, l'A. defend la these intentionnaliste de l'apparence phenomenale des couleurs, en particulier, et des caracteristiques qualitatives de l'experience perceptive, en general. Rejetant la forme intentionnaliste de l'internalisme des qualias, l'A.
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Synthese, 2015
According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation.
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According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation.
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Mediaeval Intentionality and Pseudo-Intentionality
Quaestio, 2010Wilfrid Sellars charged that mediaeval philosophers confused the genuine intentionality of thinking with what he called the “pseudo-intentionality” of sensing. I argue that Sellars’s charge rests on importing a form of mind/body dualism that was foreign to the Middle Ages, but that he does touch on a genuine difficulty for mediaeval theories, namely ...
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1986
Abstract Argues that there are two reasons for ascribing to mental states, structures more fine‐grained than the sets of possible world they represent: first, fine‐grained structure enters naturally into the explanation of behaviour; second, fine‐grained structure is needed in a theory of how those states represent the sets of possible ...
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Abstract Argues that there are two reasons for ascribing to mental states, structures more fine‐grained than the sets of possible world they represent: first, fine‐grained structure enters naturally into the explanation of behaviour; second, fine‐grained structure is needed in a theory of how those states represent the sets of possible ...
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Intentionality and Interpersonal Relations
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2009The present commentary re-introduces Heider's (1958) common-sense psychology and his treatment of intentionality, comparing and contrasting his theoretical formulations with those of Elstrup (IPBS: Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 43:4, 2009).
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2011
I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with inter-subjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality.
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I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with inter-subjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality.
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We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood
Journal of Social Ontology, 2021Dan Zahavi
exaly
Understanding Side-Effect Intentionality Asymmetries: Meaning, Morality, or Attitudes and Defaults?
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2021Brandon Reich, Sean Laurent
exaly
On the Pure Intentionality of Pure Intentionality
The Modern Schoolman, 2001openaire +1 more source