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Developmental Science, 2006
Abstract We argue for the importance of processes of shared intentionality in children's early cognitive development. We look briefly at four important social‐cognitive skills and how they are transformed by shared intentionality. In each case, we look first at a kind of individualistic version of the skill – as exemplified most clearly in the behavior
Michael, Tomasello, Malinda, Carpenter
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Abstract We argue for the importance of processes of shared intentionality in children's early cognitive development. We look briefly at four important social‐cognitive skills and how they are transformed by shared intentionality. In each case, we look first at a kind of individualistic version of the skill – as exemplified most clearly in the behavior
Michael, Tomasello, Malinda, Carpenter
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Is so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality?
Axiomathes, 2021This paper addresses the title question and provides an argument for the conclusion that so-called phenomenal intentionality, in both its relational and non-relational construals, cannot be identified with intentionality meant as the property for a mental state to be about something.
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2018
Intentionality comes from the Latin verb intendo meaning to aim, hold out, or stretch. In the context of phenomenology, it refers to consciousness’s ability to be of or about things—how consciousness can direct itself toward objects internal (images, memories, etc.) and external (things, relations, and events in the world ...
Emmy van Deurzen, Claire Arnold-Baker
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Intentionality comes from the Latin verb intendo meaning to aim, hold out, or stretch. In the context of phenomenology, it refers to consciousness’s ability to be of or about things—how consciousness can direct itself toward objects internal (images, memories, etc.) and external (things, relations, and events in the world ...
Emmy van Deurzen, Claire Arnold-Baker
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Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality
Monist, 2013I will focus here on the following questions. (1) What constitutes the most fundamental kind of semantic content in thought and language, the kind of content sometimes called Original intentionality'? (2) Could suitably sophisticated robots be capable of original intentionality, solely by virtue of the functional roles played by their internal states ...
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2005
Preface List of Abbreviations One: Laird ADDIS: The Necessity and Nature of Mental Contents Two: Philip J. BARTOK: Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of the Mental Three: William FISH: Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality Four: Gabor FORRAI: Lockean Ideas as Intentional Contents Five: Jussi HAUKIOJA: Normativity and Mental Content Six: Greg JESSON ...
Gábor Forrai, George Kampis
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Preface List of Abbreviations One: Laird ADDIS: The Necessity and Nature of Mental Contents Two: Philip J. BARTOK: Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of the Mental Three: William FISH: Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality Four: Gabor FORRAI: Lockean Ideas as Intentional Contents Five: Jussi HAUKIOJA: Normativity and Mental Content Six: Greg JESSON ...
Gábor Forrai, George Kampis
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Mediaeval Intentionality and Pseudo-Intentionality
Quaestio, 2010Wilfrid Sellars charged that mediaeval philosophers confused the genuine intentionality of thinking with what he called the “pseudo-intentionality” of sensing. I argue that Sellars’s charge rests on importing a form of mind/body dualism that was foreign to the Middle Ages, but that he does touch on a genuine difficulty for mediaeval theories, namely ...
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Abstract This chapter focuses on intentionality itself, that is, on the nature of the contact between subject and object. It explores and commends a tradition which construes intentionality as intrinsically relational, contra some present-day views which understand intentionality as a non-relational mental representation (7.1).
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2011
I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with inter-subjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality.
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I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with inter-subjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality.
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2009
Abstract Hume's chief weapon against causal realism is the argument from nonsense: for a view even to be a candidate for being right, it must first be intelligible to us. This chapter argues that, while Hume is not a positivist or verificationist, his account of intentionality, and in particular his denial of meaning to definite ...
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Abstract Hume's chief weapon against causal realism is the argument from nonsense: for a view even to be a candidate for being right, it must first be intelligible to us. This chapter argues that, while Hume is not a positivist or verificationist, his account of intentionality, and in particular his denial of meaning to definite ...
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